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Abstract
We argue that corruption can decrease aggregate productivity by deteriorating firm manage-
ment practices. We investigate the impact of regional corruption on the management quality of
firms within the manufacturing sector in Central and Eastern Europe. To do this we construct
a new data set merging a survey of firm management practices and regional measures of cor-
ruption from population and firm surveys. The empirical challenge is that bribing practices in
the public sector may evolve in response to firm behaviors, and regional corruption is measured
with error. To identify causal eﬀects, our preferred specifications use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
instrumental variable methodology. We measure the manufacturing industries’ sensitivity to
corruption using their level of dependence to contract institutions. Controlling for regional
and manufacturing industry - country fixed eﬀects, we find that firms in more contract depen-
dent industries located in more corrupt regions tend to have lower management quality, more
centralized decision-making process and lower level of education of administrative workers. In
more corrupt regions, contract dependent firms are also characterized by lower investments in
R&D and smaller product markets. Using falsification tests, we show that contract dependent
firms do not appear more aﬀected than other firms by business barriers such as transport in-
frastructure, level of taxes and tax administration, or access to finance. By contrast, contract
dependent firms systemically report corruption as a more severe barrier in doing business, and
particularly corruption in the judicial system.
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1 Introduction
The impact of corruption on economic performance is a key issue in development eco-
nomics, central to the evaluation and design of public policies. A large existing literature
investigates the determinants of corruption, and its eﬀect on entrepreneurship. Corruption may
deter entrepreneurial activity, private investment, tax revenues, waist resources and obstruct
the implementation of necessary regulations.1 The World Bank estimates that 1 trillion USD,
around 3.3% World GDP, is spent on bribes every year (World Bank, 2004). However, most
of the existing empirical evidence on the eﬀect of corruption on economic performance is based
on cross-country studies. This empirical strategy provides incomplete evidence of the driving
mechanisms behind the impact of corruption on economic performance. Corruption may have
important eﬃciency costs for the economy, additional to the amount of bribes paid to public
oﬃcials. Therefore, the eﬀect of corruption on firm performance, and the associated underly-
ing mechanisms, need to be assessed when designing anticorruption and development policies
(Olken and Pande, 2011, Sequeira, 2012).
This paper estimates the eﬀect of regional corruption on firm management quality within the
manufacturing sector. We construct a new data set merging measures of management quality
and management practices in Central and Eastern Europe at the firm level, measures of regional
corruption from household and firm surveys, and measures of sensitivity to corruption based
on the contract dependence of diﬀerent manufacturing industries. The precise identification
of the impact of corruption on firm management quality and performance is diﬃcult. Bribing
practices can partly be a response to a dysfunctional political or economic environment. We use
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy, based on the diﬀerent level of exposure to cor-
ruption in order to circumvent this endogeneity issue. By comparing firms that operate within
the same region but have diﬀerent exposure and dependence to public services, we are able to
determine the precise channels through which corruption aﬀects firm performance. We deter-
mine the firm’s exposure to corruption and the institutional environment based on the level of
contract dependence within their industry. We find a strong association between industry’s con-
tract dependence and manager’s evaluations of corruption as a barrier in doing business. Based
on this relationship, we estimate diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences instrumental-variables specifications,
which display a sizable eﬀect of corruption on management quality, management practices and
firm development. The purpose of this strategy is twofold. First, it allows us to distinguish
the eﬀect of corruption on firms that is exogenous to firm behavior and is based on contract
dependence from other endogenous forms of corruption, such as state capture. Second, this
strategy determines the mechanisms through which exposure to corruption can impose barriers
on firm performance, management practices and overall management quality
Our identification strategy delivers four main results. First, without controlling for the
endogeneity of corrupt practices, we find a robust negative correlation between management
quality and corruption. For the assessment of corruption we use two measures of corruption
based on managers’ evaluation of corruption as a barrier in doing business and the frequency of
1See among recent examples: Svensson (2003), Fisman and Svensson (2007), Bertrand et al. (2007), the
reviews of Olken and Pande (2011) and Banerjee et al. (2012) and references therein.
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corruption, and a household measure of the frequency of corruption when interacting with public
authorities. Second, we confirm the negative relationship between corruption and management
quality by using our preferred diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification within regions. In more
corrupt regions, firms with higher contract dependence have substantially worse management
practices than firms with lower contract dependence. We find that for a typical establishment,
with median contract dependence, an increase of regional corruption from the level observed
in West Ukraine to the level observed in East Ukraine, would decrease management quality by
roughly one standard-deviation. These large estimates do not appear to be driven by omitted
variables or measurement error. Third, we explore specific forms of managerial organization.
Contract dependent establishments located in more corrupt regions are characterized by a lower
quality of management, a substantially more centralized decision-making process and lower level
of education of administrative employees. In corrupt regions, contract dependent firms are also
characterized by lower development prospects. This is depicted in the reduced planning of
production targets, lower investments in R&D and smaller product markets. These findings
indicate that management practices are a possible channel through which corruption aﬀects
firm performance.
We examine the deterrence of management practices as a possible transmission channel
for the negative relationship between corruption and firm performance. To do this, this pa-
per builds on three main strands of the literature. The first strand of the literature relates
management practices and firm growth. Management practices are strongly linked to firm per-
formance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Improvements in management are associated with
higher annual sales growth, profitability and survival rates (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).
Recent experimental evidence from India identifies a causal impact of management quality on
firm productivity (Bloom et al., 2011). Management practices are aﬀected by the firm’s own-
ership structure (multinational firms and private ownership), competition and human capital
(Bloom et al., 2010a,b). Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) also find that firm productivity and
management quality in developing countries are significantly lower than in developed countries.
A second strand of the literature relates the institutional setting and firm organization. In-
stitutional quality and corruption may aﬀect firm organization. Firstly, corruption could divert
firm inputs from their main economic activity. For example, Dal Bo and Rossi (2007) shows that
firms distributing electricity, in more corrupt countries, employ more labor inputs to produce
the same level of output. The uncertainty of a corrupt business environment, where govern-
ment oﬃcials are able to capture benefits from firms, may also discourage firm investment and
expansion strategies (Ades and Di Tella, 1997). In addition, the illegality of corruption and
the need for secrecy could drive firms to adopt specific corporate governance structures and
obstruct change and innovation (Murphy et al., 1993). Managers may seek to conceal financial
information and firm operations, or limit employee involvement in the decision making process,
to reduce the risk of information leakages and minimize rent seeking from public oﬃcials.
Finally, a recent literature examines the determinants of vertical integration and central-
ization of firms across countries. Trust is related to centralization within multinational firms
Bloom et al. (2009). Acemoglu et al. (2010) and Bloom et al. (2009) find that countries with
higher level of inter-individual trust and higher level of product market competition favor less
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centralized multinational firms, while countries with weak contracting institutions, severe con-
tract enforcement problems, and suﬃcient financial development tend to favor more vertically
integrated firms.
This paper makes three important contributions. First, we estimate how management prac-
tices depend on the quality of the business environment, based on the interactions that occur
between the firms and the state. Transition countries provide an ideal experiment to study
the linkages between firm behavior and corruption. Communism bequeathed weak legal and
political institutions. As a result, transition countries are still characterized by various forms of
corruption and ineﬀective institutions (Slinko et al., 2005). Based on our measures of corruption
at the regional level, we find evidence supporting that each firm adopts its own best practices.
Second, we focus on regional corruption, in contrast to most of the existing literature that
uses measures of corruption either at the country level or at the firm level. The use of this re-
gional variation allows us to control for country specific heterogeneity and to estimate more pre-
cisely the eﬀect of corruption. The institutional set-up diﬀers significantly across the transition
countries of the study. Russia underwent substantial political and institutional decentralization
in the 1990s, through which its administrative regions gained some legislative and regulatory
autonomy (Shleifer and Treisman, 2005), while Uzbekistan maintained a (more) centralized
legislation. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), very high and heterogeneous corruption
levels can occur when weak state governments do not control their local administration authori-
ties. Therefore, we are able to exploit substantial heterogeneity in the level of corruption across
countries and regions.
Finally, our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy isolates one of the mechanisms
that is driving the relationship between corruption and firm performance. We isolate the eﬀect
of corruption on firm management quality by looking at manufacturing industries with diﬀerent
levels of contract dependence and exposure to the institutional environment. Theorists argue
that corruption and deficient contract institutions increase the risks of moral hazard in the
contracts between the firms and their suppliers, thus elevating the costs of contract dependent
inputs (Acemoglu et al., 2007). Therefore we expect that corruption will disproportionately
hurt firms typically dependent on contracts for their production process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our assumptions about the rela-
tionship between corruption and management practices. Section 3 describes the measures of
corruption and management practices and some summary statistics. Section 4 describes our
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy. Section 5 describes our main empirical findings
on the eﬀects of corruption on management practices. Section 6 investigates the eﬀect of cor-
ruption on specific management practices, the centralization of the firm decision process, and
firm performance. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical mechanisms
Corruption is expected to deteriorate management quality through two main channels. First,
firms may adapt their structures according to regional institutions and corruption, which can
lead to ineﬃciencies. Corruption may urge managers to engage in activities that are not directly
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productive, such as alluring public oﬃcials through unoﬃcial payments or gifts in exchange for
various services. These additional operational costs from corruption can cause a distortion of
firm resources and activities away from eﬃciency. Firms may also choose specific forms of gov-
ernance to deal with the conditions of a corrupt business environment and maintain the secrecy
of any illegal interactions with the state. Isomorphic pressures can also have a strong eﬀect on
organizational strategies and culture, and institutional pressures may lead to mimetic behav-
iors (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). Corruption and the expectation of unoﬃcial payments
and gifts depict an environment of favor-for-favors that can create ineﬃciencies in firms and
influence their internal structure through management practices. Second, some firms may pay
bribes to outbid competing parties in public procurement and influence government decrees to
increase their market share. The resulting regulations would not impose suﬃcient pressure for
the adoption of more competitive firm structures. This can obstruct the development of ef-
fective firm strategies, incentives for firm restructuring, and employee empowerment, resulting
in lower management quality. For example, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2012) show that the
most corrupt regions in Russia delay or circumvent the implementation of liberalization poli-
cies. This generates considerable ineﬃciency, as incumbents may be favored over new entrants
or innovative firms. Consequently we expect that firms operating in more corrupt regions will
have lower management quality.
Turning to specific forms of management, we expect the impact of corruption to be spread
on the management of the production process and human resource management. Managers
would be expected to trade oﬀ aspects of operational eﬃciency in order to deal with public
sector corruption. First, exposure to corruption could negatively impact performance monitor-
ing. For example, in the presence of widespread corruption there may be less incentives for
monitoring the production process, in order to minimize the financial information on which
oﬃcials can extract bribes. We also anticipate that exposure to corruption would deter firms
from setting a long-term growth strategy, due to the occurrence of additional unanticipated
costs, from a dysfunctional institutional environment and increased uncertainty. Second, in
more corrupt regions, firms could suﬀer from an ineﬃcient allocation of human capital. For
example, firms may have a larger share of administrative employees by manufacturing plant, to
deal with corruption, bureaucracy and the barriers from interacting with the public sector.
The eﬀect of corruption on firms could also be apparent in their internal decision-making
process. If top managers engage in bribing public oﬃcials but want to facilitate and conceal
these activities, they will tend to have a more centralized and concentrated decision-making
process within the higher levels of management. Therefore a corrupt public sector could be
related to management teams with more executive powers in the private sector, whereas high
inter-individual trust and strong rule of law have been associated with a decentralized firm
decision-making process (Bloom et al., 2009).
Our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy is related to the incomplete contract the-
ory developed by Williamson (1975, 1987). We compare management practices in firms, within
the same region, based on their industry’s reliance on contract dependent inputs. This can be
seen as a test of the theoretical framework of Acemoglu et al. (2007). Acemoglu et al. (2007)
extend the theoretical model of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). Their
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model assumes that more advanced technologies require a larger number of contracts with sup-
pliers. In more corrupt countries, the court system may be less fair and impartial and able
to enforce its decisions. Therefore, in a corrupt business environment, a smaller set of inputs
is contractible. Suppliers face hold-up problems when they undertake relationship specific in-
vestments for which they have to bargain ex-post with the downstream firms. The model of
Acemoglu et al. (2007) predicts that contracting institutions mostly aﬀect industries with higher
contract-dependence, driving them to fewer investments in contractible and non-contractible ac-
tivities, higher degrees of vertical integration, and lower technological innovation. Furthermore,
even if contractual institutions are partly fixed at the national level, their model predicts that
small regional changes in the number of contractible inputs can generate large changes in the
productivity and investment levels.
3 Data and preliminary evidence
3.1 Regional corruption in Central and Eastern Europe
We investigate the eﬀect of regional corruption on management practices in Central and
Eastern Europe. Corruption is particularly severe in this region, based on the ICRG (Inter-
national Country Risk Guide) data, the measure of controlling corruption within the political
system is 2/5 compared to a World average of 2.5/5 in 2009. There is a discussion in the cor-
ruption literature on whether national or regional corruption is the more appropriate unit to
measure corruption (Olken and Pande, 2011). The eﬀect of corruption on firms may occur at
each of these units, and which matters the most has not been determined. We focus on regional
corruption for the pragmatic reasons that we only observe management practices for ten tran-
sition countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In our within country estimates, all the eﬀects of national corruption
on firms are absorbed into country fixed eﬀects. However, it is clearly of interest to investigate
regional corruption, since most of the interactions between the firms and the state takes place
at the regional public authorities. Furthermore above 60% of the variation in corruption occurs
between regions of the same countries. It is therefore natural to expect that a large fraction of
the eﬀect of corruption on firms will arise at the regional level.
We use two surveys to evaluate regional corruption. The Business Environment and En-
terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) and the Life In Transition Survey (LITS) are two joint
initiatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World
Bank. The BEEPS survey examines the quality of the business environment, determined by
several questions on the interaction between the private and the public sector. It provides an
assessment of corruption, from firm managers in 2009. The LITS survey provides a household
assessment of corruption in 2006. In both surveys, regions are defined as large subnational
entities, on average 5 by country. For European countries, the regions correspond to the third
level of the Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS3). For the non-European
countries, the EBRD and the World Bank grouped existing national administrative divisions
for sampling purposes where necessary (EBRD, 2008, 2010).
6
We follow two approaches to measure the firms’ assessment of regional corruption using the
BEEPS 2009 survey.2 First, to measure corruption and bribery in regional business-state inter-
actions, we compute the regional average of the amount of bribes paid by firms. The amount
of bribes paid by firms is summarized by the average regional ratio of bribes over annual sales.
This ratio builds on Svensson (2003) and Reinikka and Svensson (2006). Although this measure
may reflect the ability of corrupt public oﬃcials to extract rents as well as the ability of firms
to grease an ineﬃcient administration, it is a direct measure of the managers’ experience of
corruption. The hypothetical question is carefully worded and limited to petty corruption to
encourage reliable responses: It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts
or informal payments to public oﬃcials to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses
regulations, services, etc. On average % of annual sales for an establishment like this one. Sec-
ond, we use the regional average of the managers’ assessments of the frequency of corruption
when dealing with the government. Managers are asked: Thinking about oﬃcials, would you say
the following statement is always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom or never true? that
firms in your line of business have to pay some irregular additional payments or gifts to ”get
things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. The answers are
coded from 1, never, to 6, always. We consider refusals and ”don’t know” answers as missing
values. We compute the standardized value of the answers and we average the values in each
region.
We measure the household assessment of regional corruption using the Life In Transition
Survey (LITS) 2006. Regional corruption is computed as the average of eight questions that
measure the access to public services. This measure of corruption examines the frequency of
unoﬃcial payments or gifts when interacting with public oﬃcials for services that should be
normally delivered free of charge. The eight questions have the same wording: In your opinion,
how often do people like you have to make unoﬃcial payments or gifts in these situations?. The
eight situations are: interacting with the road police, requesting oﬃcial documents (e.g. pass-
port, visa, birth or marriage certificate, land register, etc.), going to courts for a civil matter,
receiving public education (primary or secondary), receiving public education (vocation), re-
ceiving medical treatment in the public health system, requesting unemployment benefits, and
requesting other social security benefits. For each question, the respondent can answer: never,
seldom, sometimes, usually, and always. These qualitative answers are given cardinal values
from 1, never, to 5, always. We consider refusals and ”don’t know” answers as missing values.
We standardize the eight household answers, and we obtain an indicator of the frequency of
bribes, by computing their average that we then standardize. We evaluate regional corruption
using the regional average (indicator) of the household responses.
Table 1 reports the diﬀerent measures of regional corruption from the BEEPS 2009 and
LITS 2006. Panel A displays the average share of firm sales paid as bribes and the managers’
assessment of the frequency of corruption, while Panel B reports the household assessment of
the frequency of corruption. Finally, Panel C displays the number of managers and household
answers that were used to assess the extent of regional corruption. The extent of regional cor-
2We use median weights for all computations. Median weights include in the projection population the
respondent establishments and the active establishments that could not be reached.
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ruption is based, on average, on the assessments of 93 managers and 165 households. Noticeably,
the firm response rate to the questions on corrupt practices is low. The non-response rate, that
includes firms refusing to answer these questions or firms reporting not to know the level of
corruption, reaches 22.0% for the question on the amount of bribes and 9.4% for the question
on the frequency of bribes paid. In comparison, nearly all households appear willing to assess
the extent of corruption. The high non-response rate of firms may be a function of the political
environment in which the firms operate. A politically repressive environment could lead firms
to misreport or underreport the level of corruption in business-state transactions (Jensen et al.,
2007). This could lead to biased estimates of the eﬀect of corruption, an issue which we ad-
dress in Section 4. All the measures of regional corruption appear to have substantial variation
across regions. 60% to 80% of the overall variance of the measures occurs within countries. The
diﬀerent measures of regional corruption appear highly correlated. Table 2 Panel A displays
the correlations between the three measures of corruption. The correlations drop slightly in
magnitude when we consider within country measures of correlations (Panel B). The diﬀerent
measures of corruption within countries remain mostly correlated above 0.2. These lower corre-
lations may be due to the lower heterogeneity of the diﬀerent forms of corruption at the country
level, or the larger sampling error of the regional estimates that are based on a small number
of observations.
Figure 1 maps the regional variation in corruption for the 56 regions in the 10 transition
countries of our sample. Panel A displays the regional average of the share of sales paid as
bribes, while Panel B displays the household assessment of the frequency of corruption. Both
measures of corruption appear spatially auto-correlated across state boundaries. However, na-
tional borders still appear to play a key role. Regions with higher density and capital cities
overall display higher levels of corruption in the 10 transition countries.
We then test the informational content of our measures of regional corruption using two of
the most widely used and established perception based measures of corruption at the country
level. Figure 2 displays the average country score according to the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) index, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and
two measures of corruption used in this paper at the firm and the household level, the share of
sales paid as bribes by firms, and the household assessment of the frequency of corruption. Both
the ICRG and CPI indices are specifically designed to allow for cross-country comparability.
The CPI captures the perception of business people, academics, and risk analysts, while the
ICRG index focuses on the perceptions of a panel of country experts. Even though percep-
tion based surveys have been widely criticized (Olken and Pande, 2011), the country rankings
based on CPI, ICRG and the two measures of corruption we use from the firm and household
surveys appear similar. Germany, Poland and Romania display systematically the lowest levels
of corruption, while Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Russia display the highest. The 10
transition countries cover a range of economic progress and corruption is a salient feature. Ac-
cording to all four measures of corruption, most countries score systematically below the world
average, with corruption levels three times above the levels of Germany.
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3.2 Management practices
We now turn to the main outcome variables of our analysis, firm management practices.
Firm-level data measuring management practices come from the Management, Organization
and Innovation (MOI) Survey. The EBRD and the World Bank implemented the Manage-
ment, Organization and Innovation (MOI) Survey from October 2008 to November 2009, in
conjunction with BEEPS 2009. The unit of observation is the establishment rather than the
corporation. Establishments, which we also refer to as plants, or firms, have their own addresses,
business names, and managers, but might be partly or wholly owned by other firms. The survey
covers 1,355 public or privately owned manufacturing establishments with 50 to 5,000 employ-
ees. None of the establishments sampled in the MOI participated in the BEEPS surveys. The
sampling frame, from which the manufacturing firms were selected, is based on the Bureau
Van Dijk’s Orbis database (as available in August 2008) with the exception of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. For the sampling frame in Kazakhstan the oﬃcial list of establishments, obtained
from the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, was used, and in Uzbekistan the
Uniform State Register of Enterprises and Organizations, published by the State Department
of Statistics of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The establishments belong to 11 manufacturing
industries: food, textiles, garments, chemicals, plastics and rubber, metallic mineral products,
basic metals, fabricate metal products, machinery and equipment, electronics, and other man-
ufacturing plants.3 All regions within a country had to be covered, and the percentage of the
sample in each region was required to be equal to at least half of the sample frame population
in each region.
The MOI survey is primarily targeted at factory, production or operation managers, who are
close to the day-to-day operations of the firm but are at the same time senior enough to provide
an overview of management practices. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, in the manager’s
native language, by interviewers employed by the market research companies responsible for
the implementation of the MOI survey in 2008 and 2009 (Bloom et al., 2012). The MOI con-
tains two types of management quality measures: experience measures based on the structural
characteristics of the plant, and perception measures, based on managers’ self-assessment of
management quality in their establishment. As argued by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001),
perception based measures of management quality can be problematic to use as dependent
variables, as they are subject to measurement error that may be correlated with unobserved
characteristics of the respondent or the establishment. We limit the risk of perception bias by
focusing on managers’ responses to questions based solely on the characteristics of the estab-
lishment’s organization.
The experience based measures of management quality correspond to an aggregate indica-
tor, which takes higher values when the establishment has adopted more advanced management
practices, in the following four areas, as in Bloom et al. (2012): operations, monitoring, targets,
and incentives. The operational indicator focuses on how the establishment handles process
problems, such as machinery breakdown. The monitoring indicator covers the collection, moni-
3These 11 manufacturing industries correspond to a grouping of International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion of All Economic Activities (ISIC3.1) codes.
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toring, revision and use of production performance indicators. The targets indicator focuses on
the time-scale of production targets, and the incentives indicator covers promotion criteria, prac-
tices for addressing poor employee performance, and rewarding production target achievement.
The final measure of management quality is a standardized average of the four components. We
also experimented by doing a principal component analysis of the four management scores. The
correlation between our measure and the first principal component is 0.96 (0.28 with the second
principal component). The first principal component explains 41.5% of the total variance, and
the first two components 66.2%. Therefore, we only report the results using the Bloom et al.
measure of management quality, which they find to be significantly correlated with several in-
dicators of firm productivity. Figures 3a and 3b display the characteristics of this management
measure. Figure 3a, the distribution of management practices appears negatively skewed, and
poorly managed establishments appear to follow heterogeneous practices. Figure 3b reports
the average management practices for the 10 countries that appear highly correlated with the
corruption measures of Figure 2. Countries are ranked in reverse order compared to their level
of corruption. Management scores range from an average score of -0.55 in Uzbekistan to 0.35 in
Lithuania. These large diﬀerences indicate that a number of firms in transition countries may
not have implemented reforms on their management practices, and operate with an outdated
organizational structure, stemming from years of central planning, and a lack of a business
development strategy (Bloom et al., 2012).
We also investigate disaggregating the management scores into their component questions.
However, answers to individual questions on management practices tend to be positively corre-
lated. The correlations between the four components of management quality and the aggregate
index range from 0.50 to 0.72.4 If a firm scores highly on one dimension of management, then it
tends to perform well on all of them. In this respect transition countries do not appear diﬀerent
from non-transition countries covered by Bloom and Van Reenen (2010). This creates diﬃcul-
ties in identifying whether corruption has a stronger impact on specific management practices.
The only exception appears to be the monitoring practices of the firms, which do not appear
significantly correlated with most other management practices.
Finally, we compute an index of the de facto organizational characteristics of the plant.
Specifically, we measure the decentralization of the decision process. We compute the average
of six questions on the decisions of managers regarding: working hours, days of factory holidays,
employing new workers, making investment decisions, introducing new products, and setting
prices. In each of these dimensions, we consider the production process to be more centralized
if managers state that they do not ask workers for their opinion prior to their decisions. The
exact wording of the questions is: Does this establishment’s top and middle management ask
workers for their opinion with regard to any of the following decisions?. Managers can answer
yes (0) or no (1). Therefore, higher values on our index indicate more centralized production
plants.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the 1, 355 manufacturing establishments of the MOI
survey. Panel A displays the main aggregate measure of management quality and its subcom-
4The correlations between the average quality of management practices and its components are reported in
Appendix.
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ponents, operation, monitoring, targets and incentives. Panel B reports our measure of the
centralization of the decision process and alternative measures of firm performance. Panel C
displays the main characteristics of the establishments that we later use as control variables: the
number of full time employees, the ownership structure, and the number of inhabitants in the
locality of the establishment. Panel D reports the two measures of firm exposure to a corrupt
business environment, contract dependence and product complexity that we discuss in Section
4.
3.3 Preliminary evidence
In this section, we report conditional correlations between the management of the manufac-
turing establishments and the diﬀerent measures of regional corruption, from the BEEPS and
LITS surveys. We relate the quality of management practices in a manufacturing establishment
to regional corruption, to various establishment characteristics, and country fixed eﬀects:
yisrc = γCrc + xisrcβ + αsc + εisrc , (1)
where i is an index for manufacturing plants, s is an index for diﬀerent manufacturing indus-
tries, r is an index for regions, and c is an index for countries. yisrc is the quality of the firm’s
management practices as described in Section 3.2. Crc are our measures of corruption, e.g. the
share of annual sales paid as bribes by the average establishment in region r. αsc is a full set
of countries interacted with manufacturing industries fixed eﬀects, that control for diﬀerences
in production technologies across countries and manufacturing industries. These controls take
into account country specific characteristics, such as rule of law and overall institutional qual-
ity. This is particularly important, since rule of law may be correlated to corruption, facilitate
contract enforcement and increase the likelihood of delegation. These fixed eﬀects also control
for the level of competition in a manufacturing industry at the national level. Since product
market competition may decrease rent seeking opportunities and increase management quality
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), it could generate negative correlations between corruption and
management practices. Finally, xisrc is a row vector of control variables at the firm level. In all
specifications, the standard errors are clustered at the regional level to take into account the
level of variation in our corruption measures.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the descriptive specifications for diﬀerent sets of control
variables. We estimate two main specifications. We consider country and manufacturing in-
dustry fixed eﬀects (Columns 1-3), and the interaction of manufacturing industries and country
dummies to capture country specific characteristics (Columns 4-6). Furthermore, we use three
diﬀerent classifications of manufacturing industries: from 11 industries in a coarse classification
(Panel A), 22 industries in the 2-digit ISIC3.1 classification (Panel B), and 59 industries in the
3-digit ISIC3.1 classification (Panel C). The most stringent specifications also control for basic
firms characteristics and a set of noise controls to correct for measurement error in management
practices (Columns 4-5). Basic firms characteristics include a quadratic function for the estab-
lishment’s size (the number of full-time permanent employees), a dummy variable for unknown
size, a series of dummy variables for the type of ownership, a series of dummy variables for the
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number of inhabitants in the locality, and a dummy variable taking value 1 if the establishment
is part of a larger firm. Noise controls include age, gender and education, the day of the week,
the time of day the interview was conducted, its duration, and a quadratic function for the
date of the interview. The partial correlations generally display the expected negative sign.
Regional corruption, measured as the frequency of bribes from firm and household surveys,
appears to significantly deter good management practices. The estimated coeﬃcients are stable
across specifications. The similarity in the estimates of the diﬀerent specifications implies that
the basic establishment characteristics are mostly orthogonal to regional corruption. In some
alternative specification (unreported), we also included additional controls that are likely to be
endogenous: the interviewers’ perception of the truthfulness of the information, their assess-
ment of the respondent’s knowledge about the firm, as well as controls for gender, and years
the respondents have been working in their position. The point estimates for the estimate of
corruption frequency on management quality were again stable.
By contrast, when we measure regional corruption using the share of sales paid as bribes,
the estimates display an expected negative sign (Column 3) or are close to zero (Column 6),
but they are all small in magnitude and insignificant at the 10% level. This underlines that
measurement error on the amount of paid bribes may bias the eﬀect of corruption on man-
agement practices towards zero. Taken at face value, the estimated eﬀects suggest that a one
standard-deviation increase in the frequency of corruption (0.43 points) is associated with a
decrease of one-tenth standard deviation of management quality (0.11 points). The estimated
association is substantial. It is the equivalent, in terms of management quality, of a move from
the average Ukrainian establishment to the average Polish establishment.
Panel D of Table 4 confirms the robustness of the cross-sectional association between re-
gional corruption, measured as the frequency of bribes, and the quality of management practices.
We add several controls at the regional level that have been emphasized by the literature as
potential determinants of management practices and firm performance. We include the share
of the population aged 15 to 65, that is out-of-the labor force or unemployed, education as a
proxy for human capital (Glaeser et al., 2004), and inter-individual trust (Fukuyama, 1996, La
Porta et al., 1997). We consider as population out of the labor force or unemployed the share
of the population aged 15 to 65 that did not work for income during the past 12 months. We
proxy education by the share of individuals between 15 and 65 years old who only completed
primary education or do not hold a degree. Inter-individual trust corresponds to the answer
to: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people. While regional education and individual trust appear to have the
expected signs, none of them is significant and the point estimates for the eﬀect of corruption
on management practices are even slightly higher than in Panel C.
Despite this large set of control variables, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the
impact of corruption on firm behavior are unlikely to identify γ, the parameter of interest,
because Crc may be correlated to unobserved firm characteristics through εisrc. This identifi-
cation problem is diﬃcult to circumvent for three main reasons. First, simultaneity can come
from the fact that more corrupt industries may have specific unobserved characteristics related
to management practices. For example, unproductive firms or badly managed firms may rely
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heavily on bribes, as a mean to improve their competitiveness, and gain access to markets.
Most firms in the MOI sample are large. This suggests that regulatory and political processes
are potentially captured by these powerful enterprises. By contrast, more productive or larger
firms may be the targets of corrupt public oﬃcials, who attempt to extort a higher amount of
bribes. The two mechanisms imply that regional corruption and firm management practices
are mutually dependent. Second, the results of the specification 1 may be aﬀected by omitted
variable biases at the regional level. We control for country fixed eﬀects and some regional
characteristics, however more corrupt regions may also be poorer, have higher criminality rates
and less eﬀective enforcement capacity. In turn, poverty rates or enforcement capacity may be
correlated with firm behaviors. For example, the legal and regulatory framework may deter cor-
ruption and ease the administrative burden, but it could also directly aﬀect firm management
practices. Hence, it is important to compare the eﬀect of corruption in diﬀerent manufacturing
industries operating under a similar level of enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Finally, the
measures of corruption may be subject to measurement error. This may lead to attenuation
bias in our fixed eﬀect specification 1. Combined, the three diﬀerent forms of biases could drive
OLS estimates to over or under-estimate γ, depending on which measure of management quality
and corruption is used.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Main empirical specification
The exposure to corruption varies across industry industries and regions. We use regional
measures of corruption and the diﬀerent sensitivities of manufacturing industries to corruption to
avoid biases due to omitted regional characteristics. More precisely, we identify manufacturing
industry characteristics that aﬀect the exposure of firms to corruption. The estimation strategy
is to run regressions of the form:
yisrc = γ × exps × Crc + xisrcβ + αsc + δrc + εisrc , (2)
where i is an index for manufacturing plants, s is an index for diﬀerent manufacturing industries,
r is an index for regions, and c is an index for countries. yisrc is a firm outcome: management
practices, centralization of the decision process, or firm performance. Crc is a measure of cor-
ruption, e.g. the share of sales paid as bribes in region r. exps is the exogenous exposure to
corruption of manufacturing industry s. The coeﬃcient of interest is γ. It captures the dif-
ferential eﬀect of regional corruption on firm outcomes. The main advantage of specification 2
compared to 1 is that it allows to control for δrc a series of regional fixed eﬀects that capture
geographical unobservable characteristics. These fixed eﬀects control for macroeconomic insta-
bility, the level of education of the labor force, the quality of regional infrastructure, and the
overall legal and institutional environment.
The final variable needed to estimate specification 2 is the manufacturing industry’s exposure
to regional corruption, exps. The literature has identified two measures of industry dependence
on corruption and institutional quality. These measures rely on the structure of manufacturing
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industry intermediate inputs to determine their dependence on contracting institutions. First,
the nature of intermediate inputs determines the industry dependence on institutions (Nunn,
2007, Rauch, 1999). Some industries depend heavily on relationship-specific investments to
produce a particular good, and corruption provides opportunities for private firms to deviate
from the specified contractual terms. For example, computer and electronic equipment manu-
facturing industries rely heavily on inputs that are not openly traded on an exchange market.
Therefore, they depend on specific contracts, and their enforcement by regional institutions.
By contrast, manufacturing firms that rely on inputs traded on markets depend less on regional
institutions. This leaves little scope for kickbacks, moral hazard, and contract enforcement.
Under this assumption, regional corruption generates larger transaction costs in the more con-
tract dependent manufacturing industries, and larger losses in management quality, as managers
have to exert more eﬀort and resources to deal with the requirements of a corrupt public sector.
Second, goods with more complex production processes may be more aﬀected by corruption and
disorganization (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). Industries that buy fewer intermediate inputs
from other industries should be less dependent on courts, regulatory authorities and regional
governments (Rajan and Subramanian, 2007, Levchenko, 2007). Chor (2010) demonstrates that
contract dependence and product complexity capture diﬀerent sources of vulnerabilities to in-
stitutions across countries.
We measure contract dependence as the share of industry inputs that are not traded on
markets (Nunn, 2007). Additionally, we define product complexity as minus the Herfindahl
index of input concentration (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). Data on the actual use of inputs
are typically not available for the countries of the MOI survey. Even if these data were available,
their use would be prohibited, since the use of inputs depends on the overall institutional envi-
ronment and regional corruption. Since the latter is precisely what we aim to investigate, this
information is contaminated. In order to avoid these endogeneity issues, we use data on contract
dependence from manufacturing industries in the United States (Nunn, 2007) and input-output
data from the U.S. (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010). Under the
assumption that US institutions do not distort the industry demand for inputs, US data allow
identifying the industry composition of input demand, driven by technological characteristics,
from the demand driven the institutional environment. For the construction of the measure
of input concentration, we use the 1997 United States benchmark Input-Output (I-O) table at
the 6 digit level, similar to the data used by Nunn (2007) to compute measures of contract-
dependence5. Finally, we match the I-O industry classication to the ISIC3.1 industries, used
in the MOI survey, by constructing a concordance. We use the I-O classication to NAICS 97
concordance from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and concordance between the
NAICS97, NAICS02 and ISIC3.1 from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We use equal
weights when we aggregate the I-O industries to the 4 digit ISIC3.1 classication (see data Ap-
pendix for detail).
For each 4-digit industry of the MOI survey, we have 1997 benchmark US data for inputs that
5Nunn (2007) and Rauch (1999) have a liberal and a conservative definition of goods, including goods sold on
an exchange market, and goods with listed prices. Throughout the paper we use their liberal definition. However,
none of the results in the paper are aﬀected if we use the conservative definition.
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are either sold on an organized exchange market, have listed prices, or inputs that do not belong
in either of the previous categories. Figure 4 reports the distribution of our two proxies for the
dependence to regional corruption across firms. Both the measure of contract-dependence and
the measure of product complexity exhibit significant variation across manufacturing industries.
The MOI survey provides information only about the main product of each establishment. Al-
though there may be some misclassification between industrial industries, this bias should be
limited in the estimation, as the main product represents on average 82% of the sales, and we
aggregate manufacturing industries at the 2 or 3 digit level.
4.2 Falsification tests and graphical evidence
Research designs produce the cleanest estimates when the treatment and control groups
are randomly assigned. Unfortunately, exposure to corruption, as measured by contract de-
pendence or product complexity, may not be randomly allocated across industries. As our
specification 2 controls for regional fixed eﬀects and country-industry fixed eﬀects, it allows for
unobserved regional characteristics that are correlated with regional corruption, and unobserved
manufacturing industry characteristics that are correlated with contract dependence or product
complexity. The crucial concern to rule out is the interaction between the two forms of unob-
served characteristics (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012, Mian and Sufi, 2012). In order to address
this concern, we investigate whether high contract dependent firms are more likely compared to
low contract dependent firms to report, certain regional characteristics and regional economic
conditions as significant business barriers. For example, we test if high contract dependent firms
are more aﬀected compared to low contract dependent firms by the quality of regional infras-
tructures. Though a definite answer to this question is diﬃcult, we investigate the relationship
between institutional dependence and managers’ assessment of business barriers, within regions,
using the BEEPS 2009 for the 10 transition countries of the MOI sample.
The BEEPS survey asks managers to assess various legal, economic, and political impedi-
ments to their business operations. We compare the managers’ assessment of business barriers
to their establishment dependence on contracts. Table 5 Panel A reports the partial correla-
tions of our measures of contract dependence and the likelihood that a manager answers that
a particular factor constitutes a severe obstacle in doing business, controlling for regional fixed
eﬀects. This specification points towards the industries that are primarily aﬀected by some
regional business barriers. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) implement a similar strategy to verify
the validity of legal origin, as an instrument for the quality of the legal system. As expected,
within a given region, the managers of contract dependent firms are more prone to state that
corruption is a problem for doing business (Column 1). Managers of contract dependent firms
are also more likely to state that the courts are corrupt and partial, while they do not tend to
report that the judicial system is slow (Columns 2 and 3). As a result, the managers’ assessment
of the quality of courts as a barrier to doing business is strongly predicted by our measure of
dependence to contractual institutions (Column 4). Similarly, managers of contract dependent
firms report being more aﬀected by political instability and crimes (Columns 5 and 6). By
contrast, there is no significant relationship between our measure of contract dependence and
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managers’ assessment of corporate tax rates, tax administration, business licensing and permits,
access to finance or transport infrastructure, as barriers in doing business (Panel C). Managers
of contract dependent firms appear only slightly more likely to state that the education of the
labor force is a problem for firm operation, though this result is only significant at the 10% sig-
nificance level (Panel C, Column 6). Overall we find that contract dependence is correlated with
the reporting of corruption as a business barrier, while it is mainly unrelated to other business
barriers, proxying for regional institutional quality and economic conditions. We interpret this
pattern as evidence that our measure of contract dependence does capture a firm sensitivity to
corruption, which is largely unrelated to other possible business barriers. Therefore, we inter-
pret the estimates of our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification 2, based on contract dependence,
as estimates that capture a causal eﬀect of regional corruption on manufacturing industries.
Panels B and E of Table 5 show that the complexity of the production process, as measured
by (minus) the Herfindahl index of inputs, captures diﬀerent industry vulnerabilities to business
barriers compared to our measure of contract dependence. In general, the estimates have the
expected sign but are not statistically diﬀerent from zero, at the 10% significance level. In un-
reported estimations, we obtain similar results, using a probit model, and alternative measures
of input diversification, such as the Gini coeﬃcient, the share of the 20 most important inputs,
or a 3-digit input classification instead of a 6-digit classification. We therefore focus on the
measure of contract dependence while robustness checks in the Appendix, when we use (minus)
the Herfindahl index to capture the complexity of the production process, report qualitatively
similar results
Figures 5 and 6 provide initial graphical evidence on the results of our identification strat-
egy. In Figure 5, we split the industries by quintiles, based on their contract dependence. High
corruption exposure industries are in the upper quintile, and low corruption exposure industries
are in the lower quintile. For each region, we calculate the quality of management practices
in the two groups. We report their relationship with regional corruption on Figure 5. For
both groups of firms, we regress management quality on regional corruption. For high contract
dependent firms, regional corruption is associated with a significant decrease in management
quality. By contrast, management quality appears nearly independent of regional corruption for
firms with low contract dependence. The diﬀerence of slopes between the two groups of firms
is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Figure 6 provides a detailed investigation of our identifying assumption. For each region,
we run a regression of our measure of management quality on the contract dependence of the
firms. Each circle in Figure 6 represents a coeﬃcient of one of these regressions, which is plotted
against the household assessment of regional corruption. The size of the circle is the number of
firms sampled in the MOI survey, with larger circles indicating more precise estimates. Most
coeﬃcients are negative, indicating that more contract dependent firms tend to have lower man-
agement quality. We then fit a regression of the estimated eﬀects of contract dependence on
regional corruption. The regression is weighted by the square root of the number of firms in
each region. The slope of the regression line is negative and statistically significant, showing
that coeﬃcients are disproportionally negative in more corrupt regions. Furthermore, regions
where a few firms are located do not appear to drive this result. Figure 6 indicates that higher
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regional corruption leads to a larger loss of management quality in more contract dependent
industries.
4.3 Impact of measurement error
The estimates of specification 2 may be biased by two forms of measurement error. First,
technological demand for firm inputs in transition countries may not be identical to the US.
Second, regional corruption is imperfectly measured. Survey reports of corruption are likely
to be approximate and partly based on the respondent’s beliefs, since the corrupt practices
are illicit and secretive. In a politically repressive environment, firms may use non-response or
false response as a self-protection mechanism (Jensen et al., 2007). Firms may also respond to
regional public sector corruption by avoiding to deal with government oﬃcials, and the amount
of paid bribes can in this case understate the actual corruption levels (Olken and Barron, 2009,
Sequeira and Djankov, 2011). In addition, the measures of regional corruption are not based on
all firms or all households in the regions, as some firms and households have not been sampled,
while others have not responded to the questions on corruption. Both forms of measurement
errors may result in biased estimates of the eﬀects of regional corruption on management prac-
tices.
Our US measure of contract dependence may be an imperfect proxy for technological de-
mand for diﬀerent inputs in transition countries. This concern is limited as we only focus on
manufacturing industries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), and a disaggregated classification of indus-
tries, that is likely to capture similar produced goods in diﬀerent countries. However, diﬀerences
in technologies across countries and regions could bias our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates.
This form of measurement error may lead to underestimate or overestimate γ in specification 2.
US-based proxies may reflect industry specific eﬀects and US industry idiosyncrasies. The later
measurement error may be correlated with some regional industry characteristics. For example,
regions with lower corruption levels may have industry characteristics that are similar to the
US manufacturing firms. This non-classical measurement error may lead to an overstatement
of the eﬀect of corruption (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007, 2010). By contrast, if US industry
idiosyncrasies are orthogonal to region specific industry characteristics, then there will be an
attenuation bias and underestimation of the true eﬀect of corruption. The consistent estimation
of the eﬀect of corruption on management quality requires a measure of contract dependence
that does not reflect a particular institutional environment. Our baseline approach is to in-
strument the interaction term between the US manufacturing industry contract dependence
and regional corruption, using manufacturing dummies interacted with regional corruption. A
simple rationale for these instruments is that they do not depend on the characteristics of US
manufacturing industries, or on specific characteristics of the regions in which manufacturing
industries operate. More precisely, we use a 4-digit manufacturing industry sensitivity to con-
tract institutions and more aggregated industry dummies.6 The reduced form specification of
the two stage least squares strategy is interesting in its own right. It estimates the diﬀerential
6Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010) examine the case in which industry fixed eﬀects and industry measures of
dependence to corruption are measured at the same level of aggregation.
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eﬀect of corruption in manufacturing industry s, γˆs:
yisrc =
￿
s
γs.C
∗
rc.1i∈s + xisrcβ + αsc + δrc + ζisrc , (3)
where C∗rc is a measure of corruption in region r. The estimator, γˆs, is consistent, when the
number of regions is large. Here, we have 56 regions, the same number of observations as in
most cross-country studies of industries (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2010, Fisman and Love,
2007). We have s instruments and Equation 2 is overidentified. This allows for testing the
validity of our instrumental variables’ strategy.
The final variable needed to estimate the system of equations 2 and 3 is a measure of re-
gional corruption, C∗rc. In the baseline specification of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007, 2010),
C∗rc is equal to Crc. As argued in Section 2, our preferred measure is the share of annual
sales, paid as bribes, from the 2009 BEEPS survey. The main advantage of this measure is
the provision of a clear scale for the level of corruption. However, this corruption measure is
subject to large measurement error. Therefore, we choose the household perception of corrup-
tion, from the LITS 2006, to compute our preferred instruments. The joint use of firm and
household surveys has two main advantages. First, the household survey covers a less selected
set of respondents, and its larger sample size may have a better representation at the regional
level. Second, the use of independent reports from diﬀerent surveys on corruption can lead to
more consistent instrumental variable estimates if the measurement errors of the two surveys
are uncorrelated (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994, Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009). The LITS
measure of regional corruption is not directly related to firm perception or experience. Further-
more, household perceptions contain significant information about corruption (Olken, 2009).
This strategy aims to overcome the benchmarking bias, caused by the fact that our measure of
contract dependence is computed from US input-output data, and the measurement error on
the reporting of bribes as a share of sales.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Reduced form and main empirical estimates
We begin our empirical investigation by reporting the results of the reduced form specifi-
cations 3. We examine how each of these industries performs in terms of management quality,
when regional corruption increases. Table 6 displays the results of simple F-tests for the dif-
ferential eﬀects of regional corruption by manufacturing industry. We test if the sensitivity of
management practices to corruption is equal across manufacturing industries. More precisely,
we test H0 : for all s, γs = γ in specification 3. The rejection of H0 also implies that corruption
has a significant eﬀect on the management of manufacturing firms.
Table 6 reports the results of the F-tests for three industry classifications and two sets
of control variables. We group manufacturing industries into industries based on the ISIC3.1
classification. Our preferred level of industry classification is the ISIC3.1 2 digit level, and
we report, as robustness checks, the results of a coarser classification, and a more granular
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classification. In all specifications, the F-tests are clustered at the regional times the coarse
manufacturing industry level. In all but two of the 18 specifications we estimate, we reject the
null hypothesis of equal eﬀect of corruption on management quality, at the 1% significance level.
For the remaining two specifications, we reject the null hypothesis of equal eﬀect of corruption,
across manufacturing industries, at the 5% significance level. There is strong evidence that
diﬀerent manufacturing industries adopt diﬀerent management practices in response to changes
in regional corruption, and that regional corruption aﬀects management practices.
Figure 6 displays the estimated industry specific sensitivities to corruption, as measured by
the household assessment of the frequency of bribes, when dealing with public oﬃcials, from
the LITS 2006. Panel A reports the estimates of industry sensitivity to corruption using a
2-digit classification on the solid line, while the vertical bars represent the 90% confidence in-
terval. Manufacturing industries are ranked based on their sensitivity level to corruption, with
more negative numbers indicating industries for which regional corruption has a higher impact
on management quality. Panel B displays similar estimates for a 3-digit classification. Each
number corresponds to the relative impact, of the industry exposure to regional corruption,
on managerial practices, estimated from equation 3. Manufacturing industries are ranked in a
consistent order. Panel A ranges from the recycling and food industries, the two industries least
aﬀected by corruption, to the manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel, and the manufacturing of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks,
which are the two industries most aﬀected by corruption. Similarly, Panel B, manufacturing
of recycling and transport equipment appears the least aﬀected by regional corruption, while
management quality in the industries of refined petroleum products, optical instruments, and
photographic equipment, appears extremely sensitive to regional corruption. This provides ev-
idence that the identification strategy we pursue in this paper does not rely on a particular
statistical specification.
Table 7 uses the diﬀerential eﬀects of corruption across manufacturing industries to im-
plement our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy. We assume that industries more
dependent to contracts will be more aﬀected by regional corruption, and that this dependence
is fully captured by our US measure of dependence to institutions. We report the estimated in-
teractions between the US industry dependence to institutions and the three diﬀerent measures
of regional corruption, according to the specification 2. Column 1 starts with the managers’ as-
sessment of corruption frequency in the interaction of their firms with public oﬃcials. Columns
2 and 3 include the household assessment of the frequency of corruption and the share of annual
sales paid in bribes, as reported by managers. Columns 3 to 6 report the estimates of the same
interaction terms but control for a set of interview, interviewer and firm characteristics. Pan-
els A to C display the estimates using a coarse industry classification, and the 2- and 3-digits
ISIC3.1 classifications, respectively. In all specifications, the estimated eﬀect of corruption on
average management practices is more negative for firms more dependent to contractual insti-
tutions. The coeﬃcients here can be interpreted as the eﬀect of regional corruption for those
firms whose dependence to contracts equals 1. As the average contract dependence is 89%, the
estimates are naturally larger than those of the simple OLS specifications reported in Table 4.
Evaluated at the mean value of contract dependence, our estimates suggest that an increase
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of one standard-deviation in the frequency of regional corruption translates into approximately
0.6 standard-deviation decrease in management quality (-0.43 x 0.89 x 1.50, Panel B, Column
5). The eﬀect of regional corruption measured by the share of sales paid as bribes is slightly
smaller. A one standard-deviation increase in this measure of corruption is associated with a
decrease of management quality by 0.4 standard-deviation (0.93 x 0.89 x 0.47, Panel B, Column
6). Compared to our descriptive specifications, our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification leads
to a larger estimated eﬀect of corruption on management practices. For example, an increase of
one standard-deviation of household assessment of corruption was associated with a decrease in
management quality by around 1/10 standard-deviation (0.43 x 0.25, Table 4, Panel D, Column
5).
Remarkably, the inclusion of extra controls only translates into very minor shifts in the coef-
ficients of our corruption variables (Table 4, Panels A to C). Since our data is non-experimental,
the possibility of industry shocks being correlated with contract dependence is a source of con-
cern. However, we find that accounting flexibly for most industry-country shocks (i.e. shocks
that aﬀect firms diﬀerently at the most detailed industry classification) seems to have a neg-
ligible eﬀect on our estimates. This suggests that contract dependence is in practice a source
of variation, which is separate from other industry specific shocks. This fact, and the evidence
presented above that contract dependent firms do not tend to over report other aspects of the
industry environment as business barriers, reinforces our belief that we are estimating the causal
eﬀect of corruption on management practices.
Table 8 reports the estimates of our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification correcting for the
benchmarking bias, from the use of US industry dependence to contracts. In this instrumental
variable specification, the point estimates are all negative, statistically significant, and of similar
magnitude to the estimates reported in Table 7 that did not correct for the US benchmarking
bias. It is important to estimate this specification because if manufacturing industries, in low
corruption regions share more similarities with US manufacturing industries compared to man-
ufacturing industries in high corruption regions, the previous OLS estimates could be upward
biased. Our instruments appear relevant and valid. In all specifications, the instruments exhibit
a strong correlation with the endogenous regressor. The First-stage F-statistics are above 15
and the Kleibergen-Paap tests reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments at the 1% level.
Therefore weak instrument biases are unlikely to be a concern (Stock et al., 2002). Furthermore,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen-test with large p-values, above 0.4. There
is no evidence that our instruments are invalid or that there is strong heterogeneity in the ef-
fect of corruption across manufacturing industries (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This approach
yields stronger evidence that regional corruption tends to deteriorate management quality in
manufacturing industries. Even if regional corruption may be measured with some error, we
find strong empirical evidence that it matters for management practices.
Table 9, panel A presents our preferred empirical estimates that correct for the measure-
ment error on our preferred measure of corruption, the average share of sales paid as bribes.
More precisely, we instrument the interaction between (US measures of) dependence to cor-
ruption, and the average share of sales paid as bribes in the region, using industry dummies
interacted with the household perception of regional corruption. Therefore, the specification
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controls for both the benchmarking bias, stemming from using US manufacturing industry de-
pendence to institutions as a proxy for industry specific characteristics, and the measurement
error on the share of sales paid as bribes. All the point estimates of the interaction term are
nearly five times larger than in Table 8 that did not account for measurement error on regional
corruption. The standard-errors are also larger. This indicates that the estimates of a simple
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification are likely to suﬀer from attenuation bias. The estimates
are stable across specifications between −1.80 and −2.60. To better evaluate the magnitude
of the estimates, we compare the industry at the first quartile of dependence to corruption
(low dependence, 0.88) to a typical industry at the third quartile of dependence (0.97). The
average estimate of corruption of -2.5 predicts that the management quality of a more contract
dependent industry would decrease by 0.5 points more than the management quality of a less
dependent industry, if regional corruption increases from the level of North to West Ukraine.
This represents a large diﬀerential from the median Ukrainian firm in terms of management
quality to the upper quartile firm. In comparison with other factors that may aﬀect manage-
ment quality, the eﬀect of corruption is substantial and plausible. In the UK context, Bloom
et al. (2010a) find quasi-experimental evidence that competition aﬀects management practices.
They estimate that one additional hospital increases management quality by a one-third stan-
dard deviation. The standard-deviation of their measure of hospital competition is 10. Thus,
for an average firm in terms of contract dependence, a decrease of one standard-deviation of the
share of sales paid as bribes would have a roughly similar impact to an increase of one standard
deviation in hospital competition (0.93 x 3.00 x 0.85, and 10 x 0.33, respectively).
Panel B explores the robustness of our estimates to some additional changes in our diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences specifications. At the national level, corruption correlates highly with increased
economic development (La Porta et al., 1999, Ades and Di Tella, 1999, Treisman, 2000, 2003).
If institutionally dependent industries are also more dependent to the level of education in the
workforce, and if regional corruption is correlated with education, our estimates could be biased.
Therefore we add three interaction terms between our US measure of dependence to contractual
institutions and regional education, inter-individual trust, and the share of the population aged
15 to 65, that is out of the labor force or unemployed. The point estimates and standard errors
of these specifications, that include additional controls, are very similar to those reported in
Panel A. To further confirm that our results are not driven by product market competition,
we estimated regressions controlling for product market competition. We used the managers’
self-reported measure of the number of their competitors coded as five dummy variables for
unknown number, no competitor, one, two to five, and more than five competitor firms. The
answers represent 6.9, 3.9, 3.5, 30.2, and 55.5% of the sample, respectively. The results led to
exactly the same conclusions as those presented here, and are therefore omitted. A likely reason
that this modification did not produce significant changes to the results is that the manufactur-
ing industry-country fixed eﬀects capture most of the variation in product market competition.
Our empirical findings are strongly in line with the theoretical model of Acemoglu et al.
(2007) that predicts that contract-dependent firms will have lower productivity, and undertake
less investment, in regions with ineﬀective contract legislation and enforcement. This issue may
be particularly strong in transition countries where the markets of intermediate goods are thin
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(Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). In the absence of alternative suppliers, firms may not be able to
avoid the adverse eﬀects of corruption on the enforcement of the contracts. Indeed, alternatives
to formal contracts such as informal contracts and reputation games would require downstream
firms to have many potential input suppliers. More generally, our estimates of the impact of
corruption on management practices corroborate the findings of Sequeira and Djankov (2011),
who find that corruption significantly aﬀects the production choices of firms. In the context of
bribery payments at African ports, they find that firms are willing to use alternative road trips
and pay higher (real) trucking costs to avoid higher bribes.
5.2 Robustness check and heterogeneity of the eﬀect
One potential problem with the previous analysis is that our measures of regional corrup-
tion are aﬀected by sampling errors. When we work on the full sample, the 2SLS estimate is
much larger than the OLS estimate (-0.464 and -3.014) even though the diﬀerence between the
two estimates is not significant. This result may be due to measurement error on the usual
share of sales paid as bribes, if the regional share of sales paid as bribes is biased by the small
number of firms interviewed in the BEEPS survey. Classical measurement error would result
in an attenuation bias on the OLS estimator. Assuming that the variance in the error aﬀecting
our measurement of regional corruption decreases with the number of firms interviewed in the
BEEPS survey, the bias should decrease with the number of firms observed in the region. If this
interpretation is correct, the diﬀerence between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates should also
decrease when focusing on regions in which more firms were interviewed for the BEEPS survey.
Table 10 provides a comparison of OLS and 2SLS estimates using the same instruments
as in Table 9 (i.e., household assessment of regional corruption interacted with manufacturing
industry dummy variables), but restricts the sample to regions with at least 19 and 49 firms
that were interviewed during the BEEPS survey. However, the OLS and 2SLS estimates remain
nearly unchanged when we restrict the sample to these regions (even though the 2SLS estima-
tor becomes more imprecise as the number of observations becomes smaller). Therefore, our
estimates do not appear driven by regions where our measure of corruption is based on a small
number of respondents. We further confirm this result by investigating the sensitivity of our
estimates to the inclusion of specific countries. We jackknife the sample of countries excluding a
country at a time and re-estimate our preferred diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification using OLS
and 2SLS as in Tables 9 and 10 (Columns 1 and 2). The point estimates are always negative
and highly statistically significant for OLS and 2SLS (Figure 8, Panels A and B). However, the
magnitude of the point estimates is sensitive to the inclusion of two of the survey countries.
Specifically suppressing Uzbekistan makes the magnitude of the estimates significantly larger
for both OLS and 2SLS, while suppressing Romania reduces partly the estimated eﬀect through
2SLS. We interpret this pattern as evidence that our estimates are not driven by some country
specific factors.
Table 11 investigates the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of corruption on management quality.
Bloom et al. (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012) have argued that foreign owned establishments may
be less aﬀected by regional factors and contribute to spread the management practices of their
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headquarters. If this relationship holds, we would expect the coeﬃcient of our interaction term
between contract dependence and regional corruption to be closer to zero for establishments
that belong to multinational companies. Indeed foreign owned establishments are on average
better managed than domestic companies. However, the management of foreign owned compa-
nies appears equally aﬀected by regional corruption as the one of domestic firms. Similarly, we
do not find significant diﬀerences in the eﬀect of corruption on management quality between
government owned and other firms, and between large (above 250 full-time employees) and
smaller firms. The burden of corruption appears equally spread across firms.
6 Detailed management practices, centralization and firm per-
formance
In this section, we investigate management practices in detail: the monitoring of the produc-
tion process, the presence of medium to long-run targets, the presence of suﬃcient incentives
in the human resources policy, and the eﬃciency of the production process in the establish-
ment. The diﬀerent forms of management practices are not independent. For example, human
resource policies are related to closer output monitoring, and to the frequency and number of
production performance indicators. We also relate regional corruption to the establishment’s
decision process. Finally, although our focus is on the impact of corruption on management
quality, we investigate the eﬀect of corruption on more direct measures of firm performance.
6.1 Detailed management practices
Table 12 reports the estimates for the aggregate index of monitoring in the production pro-
cess. This aggregate index takes into account the number of performance indicators monitored
in each establishment, and their review frequency by top and middle managers. Panel A reports
OLS estimates of the descriptive specification 1, while Panel B reports OLS estimates of the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification 2, and Panel C reports the instrumental variable estimates
of specification 2 that control for the US benchmarking bias. We focus on the household per-
ceptions of the frequency of bribes. There is a negative correlation between regional corruption
and monitoring in the production process (Column 1, Panel A). This negative relationship is
also observed between, contract dependence and monitoring. More contract dependent firms, in
more corrupt regions, appear to have a significantly lower level of monitoring in the production
process (Column 1, Panels B and C).
A substantial lack of formal maintenance procedures, methods of quality control and in-
ventory may be linked to a weak development strategy and ability to set targets. Column
2 of Table 12 investigates the relationship between corruption and the setting of production
targets. We examine whether the managers of the establishment are setting a timescale for
the production targets of their main product. This timescale includes short-term (less than
one year), or short and long-term (more than three years) production targets that are set to-
gether or independently. Firm exposure to corruption appears associated with the absence of
a timescale of production targets for the main product. This finding could be linked to the
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negative impact of corruption on the monitoring quality, the review and coverage of monitoring
indicators, which are a valuable tool for the setting of long-term targets. Firms operating in
a corrupt environment may have an incentive to avoid monitoring in the production process,
since the availability of this information could increase the risk of being approached for higher
bribes by public oﬃcials. At the same time, firms with limited monitoring and low quality of
data systems measuring production performance indicators, and general outputs and inputs,
could have a higher likelihood for undetected theft (Bloom et al., 2011).
We now turn to human resource management. Columns 3-6 of Table 12 examine the relation-
ship between corruption, a general index of worker incentives, the turnover of the workforce, and
the level of education of production workers and administrative employees (including managers).
The general index of worker incentives captures the distribution of rewards when production
targets are met (no rewards, only top and middle management is rewarded, all staﬀ is rewarded),
the establishment’s main policy for employees that do not meet expectations (rarely or never
moved from their position, not removed for at least a year before action is taken, rapidly moved
and retrained and dismissed if not improved), and the rewards for top-performing employees.
Column 3, corruption appears related to the permanency of a position and an overall lack of
meritocratic employment policy. However, the point estimates are not statistically significant
at the 10% level when we consider the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specifications of Panels B and C.
We then investigate the components of human resource management to detect which spe-
cific human resource policies are the most aﬀected by corruption. Column 4 investigates the
relationship between workforce turnover (measured as the share of employees that quitted the
establishment over the last administrative year) and corruption. Consistent with a lack of in-
centives and rewards, contract dependent firms have higher workforce turnover in more corrupt
regions (Column 4, Panels B and C). This could mean that the eﬀect from the lack of rewards
for well performing employees dominates the eﬀect from the lack of sanctions for employees,
who do not meet managers’ expectations. Columns 5 and 6 provide additional support for this
interpretation. They examine the relationship between corruption and the human capital in the
firm, measured as the share of employees with a college degree. More contract dependent firms
have a lower educated workforce in more corrupt regions. In particular, the share of adminis-
trative employees, including managers with a college degree, is significantly lower for contract
dependent firms in more corrupt regions (Column 6). The results are in line with the negative
association between corruption and the quality of human resource policies in the public sector.
The adoption of incentive policies and closer monitoring may deter corrupt practices by public
oﬃcials (Olken and Pande, 2011).
Table 13 Column 1 turns to another dimension of management practices, process manage-
ment. We find that there is a negative but insignificant relation between exposure to corruption
and process management. This may be due to the small variation in the manager’s answers.
Specifically, process management corresponds to the course of action taken in the occurrence of
process problems. In this question, a large majority of managers (97%) replies that when process
problems occur action is taken and prevention measures are implemented. Unfortunately, the
question does not include other aspects of process management, for example the time required
to process the problem or the occurrence of delays, which could oﬀer a better insight into the
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eﬀects of a corrupt environment.
6.2 Centralization
We further investigate the internal policy underlying the implementation process within the
firm. We determine centralization, as a measure of hierarchy and decision-making, when the
activities of the firm and the decision-making process are accumulated on the group of managers,
and not dispersed across the production employees. Table 13 Column 2, we observe that, in
contract dependent firms, corruption leads to a higher concentration of the decision-making
process on the group of managers compared to less contract dependent firms. The magnitude
of the association between the centralization of the decision process and regional corruption is
economically sizable. For a firm with median contract dependence, a one standard-deviation
increase in regional corruption would be associated with a 0.4 standard-deviation increase in the
centralization of the decision process (0.43 x 0. 93 x 0.26/0.26=0.40, Column 2, Panel C). This
confirms that, in environments of widespread corruption, more conservative and centralized
structures may persist, and a delegation of responsibilities could be limited to a closed network,
for example family members (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).
6.3 Firm performance
Table 13 Columns 3 to 6 investigate the direct impact of corruption on firm performance.
We find that corruption tends to lower innovation, as measured by two dummy variables, the
introduction of a new product or service over the last 3 years, and the likelihood to have
undertaken some R&D investment over the last fiscal year. More contract dependent firms
appear to have lower levels of innovation and to undertake less R&D investments in more
corrupt regions (Columns 3 and 4, and Panels B and C, respectively). This result is in line
with the theoretical model of Acemoglu et al. (2007) that predicts that in regions with greater
corruption and contract incompleteness, firms should adopt less advanced technologies, and that
this eﬀect should be relatively stronger for more contract dependent industries. As described
by Acemoglu et al. (2007) contracting institutions can then generate endogenous comparative
advantage diﬀerences across regions. Consistent with this framework, more contract dependent
firms, located in more corrupt regions, tend to have relatively smaller markets. Their managers
report that their main product is sold mostly in the same municipality that the establishment
is located rather than on a national or international market (Column 5). The exact wording of
the question is: In fiscal year 2009, which of the following was the main market in which this
establishment sold its main product? Managers can answer: Local (main product sold mostly
in same municipality where the establishment is located), National (main product sold mostly
across the country where the establishment is located), or International (main product sold
mostly to nations outside the country where the establishment is located). On average, 21.3%
of the managers state that the establishment’s main market is local, 54.2% state that it is
national, and 23.4% state that it is international. This eﬀect appears mainly driven by a lack
of competitiveness of contract dependent firms on export markets (Column 6). The magnitude
of the eﬀect is economically sizable. When the household perceptions of the frequency of bribes
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increase by one standard-deviation (0.43), the estimate of Column 6 Panel C predicts that a
firm at the last decile of contract dependence (0.98) would become by 11 percentage points less
likely to mainly export its products to foreign markets compared to a firm at the first decile
of contract dependence (0.68). As only 23.4% of the establishments are exporting their main
product, corruption substantially shapes the manufacturing structure of regional exports. The
two later findings confirm the results observed on international trade patterns. Nunn (2007)
and Chor (2010) find that countries with better contract enforcement export relatively more in
industries that require relationship-specific investments.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that corruption aﬀects the adoption of firm management practices.
We find that more contract dependent firms, operating under a corrupt business environment,
adopt less eﬃcient management practices. For a typical establishment, with median contract
dependence, an increase of regional corruption from the level observed in West Ukraine to the
level observed in East Ukraine, would decrease management quality by roughly one standard-
deviation. This eﬀect is large, albeit imprecisely estimated. Furthermore, we believe that, if
anything, we are undercounting the eﬀect of corruption on management practices. In general,
we would expect state level corruption to be a particularly important driver of firm behaviors.
Our study focuses, however, only on regional corruption, an important if only partial measure
of corruption.
We have argued that our findings are not consistent with the existence of omitted factors
correlated with industry contract dependence. Consistent with contract dependence identifying
corruption specific vulnerabilities, more contract dependent firms do not appear more likely
to state that other aspects of the business environment represent significant obstacles. Hence
comparing firms of the same region that are diﬀerently aﬀected by corruption should be an
eﬀective way of dealing with the possible endogeneity of corrupt practices. As an alternative
to our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification estimated by OLS, we also present 2SLS estimates
that control for measurement error on our measures of corruption and contract dependence.
The 2SLS estimates are larger than our OLS estimates.
The actual eﬀects of corruption appear to be spread across management practices and to
aﬀect the internal structure of the firm. In more corrupt regions, more contract dependent firms
appear less well monitored, less likely to fix production targets, substantially more centralized
than less contract dependent firms, and with lower level education among administrative em-
ployees. Corruption has also a clear eﬀect of firm development and performance. Regional
corruption is associated with lower levels of innovation and R&D investment, and lower export
prospects for contract dependent firms.
A drawback of our investigation is the cross-sectional nature of our data since management
quality is only available for a single year. Future work could use several waves of management
measures to investigate the eﬀects of institutional changes on firm management practices.
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Data appendix
Detailed corruption questions (BEEPS)
We use the BEEPS 2009 survey to compute regional corruption. We use information for
all firms in manufacturing sectors and services. In addition to the 11 manufacturing sectors
surveyed in the MOI survey (food, textiles, garments, chemicals, plastics & rubber, metallic
mineral products, basic metals, fabricate metal products, machinery and equipment, electronics,
and other manufacturing plants), the BEEPS survey includes information on services (wholesale
and retail trades, services of motor vehicles - section G -, and hotel and restaurants - section H
-), computer and related activities (IT), the construction sector - section F -, and the sector of
transport, storage and communications - section I -. By contrast, the BEEPS survey does not
contain information on real estate and renting activities, financial intermediation, and public
and utilities sectors. We use median weights for all computations involving the 2009 survey7.
The share of sales paid as bribes comes from three questions in the BEEPS survey 2009. The
main question is the following: It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make
gifts or informal payments to public oﬃcials to ”get things done” with regard to customs, taxes,
licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales, or estimated
total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public
oﬃcials for this purpose (j7a). If the respondent reports the total amount of bribes rather than
the share of sales paid as bribes (j7b), the total amount of bribes is divided by the total sales
of the last complete fiscal year (question d2). Refusals and ”don’t know” answers have been
coded as missing.
The barrier to growth measure of corruption comes from the question: As I list some factors
that can aﬀect the current operations of a business, please look at this card and tell me if you
think that each factor is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, a major obstacle,
or a very severe obstacle to the current operations of this establishment (corruption question
j30f). Answers are recoded from 0, no obstacle, to 4, very severe obstacle. Refusals and ”don’t
know” answers are coded as missing.
Variance decomposition formula
In Table 1, we decompose the total variance in these regional averages into the parts of the
variance within and between countries using the relationship:
1
R
￿
c
￿
r
(xcr − x..)2 = 1
R
￿
c
￿
r
(xcr − xc.)2 + 1
R
￿
c
Rc(xc. − x..)2 ,
where r is an index for regions, and c is an index for countries. xcr is a particular measure of
corruption averaged at the regional level.x.., xc. are unweighted overall and country averages.
There are Rc regions in country c. R is the total number of regions across all countries in our
sample.
7Median weights correspond to an adjustment of the stratum of the survey. Median weights include in the
projection population the answering establishments and the active establishments that could not be reached.
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Matching industry classifications
We match the US I-O industry classication to the ISIC3.1 industries used in the MOI survey,
by constructing a concordance using the I-O classication to NAICS 97 concordance from the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and concordance between the NAICS97, NAICS02
and ISIC3.1 from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
More precisely, we use the following files:
- http://www.bea.gov/national/zip/ndn0306.zip (NAICS-IO.xls and NAICSUseDetail.txt);
- http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/files/contract intensity IO 1997.xls;
- http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/1997 NAICS to 2002 NAICS.xls;
- http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/2002 NAICS to ISIC 3.1.xls.
We map the I-O 6-digit classification to the NAIC97, then to the NAICS2002, and to the
ISIC3.1 classifications. There are some ISIC3.1 industries that overlap several I-O codes, and
we use equal weights when we aggregate the I-O industries to the 4 digit ISIC3.1 classication. In
the end, for each 4-digit ISIC3.1 industry of the MOI survey, we have 1997 benchmark U.S. data
on the concentration of inputs and the fraction of inputs that is either sold on an organized
exchange market, have listed prices, or inputs that do not belong in either of the previous
categories.
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F igure 1. Map of regional corruption 
F igure 1.a. F i rm share of sales paid as bribes (B E EPS 2009) 
 
F igure1.b. Household assessment of the frequency of corruption (L I TS 2006) 
 
Note: Share of firm sales paid as bribes according to the BEEPS 2009 and household assessment of the frequency of 
corruption according to the LITS 2006. Far-East Russia is not included in the MOI sample and not represented on 
the map. The 56 regions are divided by quartiles. Darker colors represent higher levels of corruption.  
Source: $XWKRUV¶ FRPSXWDWLRQV based on the BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB) and the Global 
Administrative Areas project.   
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F igure 2. Corruption measures across transition countries in 2009 
 
2.a Perception of corruption (ICRG) 2.b Perception of corruption (CPI) 
  
2.c. Share of ILUPV¶sales paid as bribes 2G+RXVHKROGV¶IUHTXHQF\RIEULEHV 
  
 
Note: Panel a displays the ICRG corruption perception index in 2009. Uzbekistan is not rated. Higher values 
indicate lower perceived corruption. Panel b displays the Transparency International CPI index in 2009. Higher 
values indicate lower perceived corruption. Panel c displays the share of sales paid as bribes by manufacturing and 
service firms in 2009, except for Germany where the measure is from the 2005 survey. Median sampling weights are 
used. Panel d displays the average frequency of corruption according to local households from the LITS in 2006. It 
is an unweighted average of 8 questions related to the frequency of bribes when households meet civil servants. The 
scores are rescaled so that Poland has a score of 0. Sampling weights are used. 
The horizontal line represents the world average. BGR stands for Bulgaria, BLR for Belarus, DEU for Germany, 
KAZ for Kazakhstan, LTU for Lithuania, POL for Poland, ROM for Romania, RUS for Russia, SER for Serbia, 
UKR for Ukraine, and UZB for Uzbekistan. 
Source: ICRG, Transparency International, BEEPS 2009 survey and LITS 2006 survey (EBRD-WB). 
  
1
2
3
4
5
IC
R
G
 c
or
ru
pt
io
n
K
A
Z
LT
U
R
U
S
B
G
R
B
LR
U
K
R
S
E
R
P
O
L
R
O
M
D
E
U
0
2
4
6
8
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
or
ru
pt
io
n
U
ZB
R
U
S
U
K
R
B
LR
K
A
Z
S
R
B
B
G
R
R
O
M
LT
U
P
O
L
D
E
U
0
1
2
3
B
E
E
P
S
 s
ha
re
 o
f s
al
es
 p
ai
d 
as
 b
rib
es
U
ZB
U
K
R
K
A
Z
R
U
S
B
LR
S
R
B
R
O
M
D
E
U
B
G
R
LT
U
P
O
L
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
LI
TS
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 c
or
ru
pt
io
n
U
K
R
U
ZB
B
G
R
R
U
S
R
O
M
K
A
Z
B
LR LT
U
S
R
B
P
O
L
35  
  
F igure 3. Distribution of management practices and country averages 
3.a. Distribution of the quality of management practices across establishments 
 
3.b. Average management practices at the country level 
 
Note: The figure reports descriptive statistics for 1,355 manufacturing establishments. All scores of management 
quality are in deviation from the sample mean and have a standard-deviation of 1. Figure 3.b displays the average 
management score in each country. 
Source: MOI 2010 (EBRD-WB), and aXWKRU¶VFRPSXWDWLRQVEDVHGRQ%ORRPet al. (2012). 
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F igure 4. Dependence on institutions by manufacturing sector 
 
 
 
 
Note: Contract dependence of manufacturing sectors at the ISIC3.1 4 digits level. The measure is the share of 
relationship-specific inputs used by each US manufacturing sector in 1997. It is computed using Nunn (2007) share 
of inputs neither traded on open markets nor listed on leaflets at the 6-digit I-O classification level. It is converted to 
ISIC3.1 sectors using the BEA correspondence between the I-O classification and the NAICS 1997 and the BLS 
correspondence files between NAICS 1997 and 2002 and NAICS 2002 and ISIC3.1. 
Source: Nunn (2007), Rauch (1999) DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQVEDVHGRQ%/6DQGBEA correspondence files. 
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F igure 5. Management quality for high and low dependent to contract firms 
  
  
Note: High and low dependent to contract firms are the top and bottom quintile firms based on the US measure of 
contract dependence. The figure plots average regional management quality for the highest and lowest quintile of the 
distribution of contract dependent firms against corruption in the region. Each dot represents the average 
management quality in a region for the low dependence and high dependence groups. The two fitted lines represent 
the different effects of corruption on management quality for the low dependence and high dependence groups of 
firms. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB)1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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F igure 6. E ffect of contract dependence on management quality across regions 
 
 
 
Note: For each region, we run a regression of management quality on the contract dependence of the firms. Each 
circle in Figure 6 represents a coefficient of one of these regressions, which is plotted against the household 
assessment of regional corruption. The size of the circle is the number of firms sampled in the MOI survey, with 
larger circles indicating more precise estimates. The straight line corresponds to the fitted line of a regression of the 
estimated effects of contract dependence on regional corruption. The regression is weighted by the square root of the 
number of firms in each region.  
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), Nunn (2007), anGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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F igure 7. Estimated dependence on institutions by manufacturing sectors 
7.a. 2-digit manufacturing sectors 
 
7.b. 3-digit manufacturing sectors 
 
Note: The figure displays the estimates and the 90% confidence intervals for the differential effects of corruption on 
manufacturing sectors within a region. Formally, the model is, Yisrc Įs.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, 
PDQXIDFWXULQJVHFWRUWLPHVFRXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWVDQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Crc is the household assessment of 
regional corruption according to the LITS (2006) and Xisrc a set of control variables. We report the estimated 
sensitivity RIPDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFHVWRUHJLRQDOFRUUXSWLRQĮs, for each manufacturing sector, s. The estimates are 
ranked by increasing order of sensitivity to regional corruption. The standard errors are clustered at the regional x 
industry level. The control variables include: 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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F igure 8. Sensitivity analysis: estimated effects of corruption using the difference-in-
differences specification estimated by O LS or 2SLS dropping country one-by-one 
F igure 8.a. O LS estimates 
 
F igure 8.b. 2SLS estimates 
 
Note: The figure reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrcZLWKȜsc, manufacturing 
sector times FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is the regional share of sales paid as bribes and Xisrc a set of control 
variables. The specification is estimated by OLS and 2SLS as in Tables 10 and 11. The countries are dropped one-
by-one.  
BGR stands for Bulgaria, BLR for Belarus, KAZ for Kazakhstan, LTU for Lithuania, POL for Poland, ROM for 
Romania, RUS for Russia, SER for Serbia, UKR for Ukraine, and UZB for Uzbekistan. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and analysis of variance of regional corruption measures 
 
  Descriptive statistics Variance  
(Share of 
variance within 
country) 
  
  
Mean S.d. Min Max Obs. 
A . F irms' assessment of regional corruption 
   
 
Share of sales paid as bribes 0.83 0.93 0.00 5.31 56 0.67 
Firms not answering the share of sales paid as bribes 0.22 0.10 0.03 0.47 56 0.62 
Frequency of bribes -0.09 0.36 -0.80 0.69 56 0.73 
Firms not answering the frequency of bribes 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.50 56 0.70 
B . Households' assessment of corruption and government quality  
Frequency of bribes 0.01 0.43 -0.57 1.57 56 0.75 
Households not answering the frequency of bribes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 56 0.85 
C . Sample size       
# firms by region (BEEPS2009) 93.16 78.22 7 544 56 0.59 
# households by region (LITS2006) 165.36 77.36 40 420 56 0.79 
 
Note: Observations are 56 regions. The frequency of bribes according to firms is the standardized value of the 
TXHVWLRQ³,s-it FRPPRQIRUILUPVLQP\OLQHRIEXVLQHVVWRKDYHWRSD\VRPHLUUHJXODU³DGGLWLRQDOSD\PHQWVRUJLIWV´
to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc"´ %((36  TXHVWLRQ
ecaq39). The frequency of bribes according to households comes from 8 questions related to the frequency of bribes 
when households interact with the road police, request official documents, have other forms of interactions with the 
police, go to courts, receive public health care or public education, and request unemployment or social security 
benefits (LITS 2006, questions q313 1 to 8). The answers to each question are standardized and averaged. The final 
indicator is standardized at the household level. The share of sales paid by firms as bribes is the percentage of total 
annual sales paid as informal payment (BEEPS 2009, questions j7a, j7b and d2). Missing values are considered as 
missing at random. For each corruption indicator, higher values indicate higher levels of corruption. 
Source: BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV. 
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Table 2. Correlation between different measures of corruption at the regional level 
 
 
F requency of bribes Share of sales paid as bribes 
 
(B E EPS 2009) (L I TS 2006) (B E EPS 2009) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A . L inear correlations between corruption indicators   
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) 1.00   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006) 0.51 1.00  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009) 0.50 0.38 1.00 
Panel B . Nonlinear correlations between corruption indicators  
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) 1.00   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006) 0.46 1.00  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009) 0.61 0.41 1.00 
Panel C . Within country linear correlations between corruption indicators 
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) 1.00   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006) 0.26 1.00  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009) 0.21 0.09 1.00 
# Regions 56 56 56 
 
Note: Observations are 56 regions. The frequency of bribes according to firms is the standardized value of the 
TXHVWLRQ³,s-it FRPPRQIRUILUPVLQP\OLQHRIEXVLQHVVWRKDYHWRSD\VRPHLUUHJXODU³DGGLWLRQDOSD\PHQWVRUJLIWV´
to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc"´ (BEEPS 2009, question 
ecaq39). The frequency of bribes according to households comes from 8 questions related to the frequency of bribes 
when households interact with the road police, request official documents, have other forms of interactions with the 
police, go to courts, receive public health care or public education, and request unemployment or social security 
benefits (LITS 2006, questions q313 1 to 8). The answers to each question are standardized and averaged. The final 
indicator is standardized at the household level. The share of sales paid by firms as bribes is the percentage of total 
annual sales paid as informal payment (BEEPS 2009, questions j7a, j7b and d2). Missing values are considered as 
missing at random. For each corruption indicator, higher values indicate higher levels of corruption. 
Panel A displays linear correlations. Panel B displays Spearman rank correlations. Panel C displays linear 
correlations controlling for country fixed-effects (within country correlations). 
Source: BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, sample of establishments 
 
 
 
 M ean Std. Dev. M in Max Obs. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A . Quality of management practices 
  Average  0.00 1.00 -3.99 2.09 1355 
      Operation  0.00 1.00 -4.48 0.81 1351 
      Monitoring  0.00 1.00 -3.53 1.72 1354 
      Targets 0.00 1.00 -1.94 1.32 1345 
      Incentives 0.00 1.00 -3.58 2.08 1354 
Panel B . Internal organization of the establishments and other outcomes  
Centralization of the decision process 0.76 0.26 0.00 1.00 1355 
Share of administrative employees 0.26 0.17 0.01 1.00 1307 
Share of college graduates among:      
             Production employees 
           
0.16 0.21 0.00 1.00 1201 
             Administrative employees 0.51 0.34 0.00 1.00 1227 
Innovation (new product in last 3 years) 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 1348 
R & D spending over last fiscal year 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 1320 
3 year averaged growth of employment1 1.75 16.79 -111.66 116.89 1105 
Establishment created less than 3 years ago 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 1355 
Main market: regional 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 1343 
Main market: international 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00 1343 
Panel C %DVLFFRQWUROVIRUHVWDEOLVKPHQWV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFV  
Establishment is part of a larger firm 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1355 
Size (full time employees) 267.17 445.93 13 5403 1343 
       Size unknown 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 1355 
Ownership      
       Multiple Owners 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 1355 
       Foreign 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 1355 
       Family 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 1355 
       Individual 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 1355 
       State 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 1355 
City size (population)      
       Population over 1 million or capital city 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 1355 
       Over 250,000 to 1 million inhabitants 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 1355 
       50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 1355 
       Less than 50,000 inhabitants 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 1355 
Panel D . Dependence to institutions      
Contract dependence 0.89 0.13 0.11 1.00 1355 
Product complexity -0.10 0.04 -0.24 -0.04 1355 
 
 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics for 1,355 manufacturing establishments.  
1. The growth rate of employment takes only into account permanent full time employees. 
Source: MOI survey (EBRD-WB), Nunn (2007), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table 4. Corruption and difference in management practices across regions 
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes  -0.265**   -0.288**   
(BEEPS 2009) (0.130)   (0.123)   
Frequency of bribes   -0.253*   -0.203  
(LITS 2006)  (0.130)   (0.127)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.027   0.001 
(BEEPS 2009)   (0.053)   (0.050) 
R-square 0.068 0.070 0.064 0.154 0.154 0.150 
Panel B . Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes  -0.274**   -0.269**   
(BEEPS 2009) (0.133)   (0.133)   
Frequency of bribes   -0.260**   -0.205  
(LITS 2006)  (0.128)   (0.124)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.024   0.026 
(BEEPS 2009)   (0.054)   (0.051) 
R-square 0.086 0.088 0.082 0.204 0.204 0.200 
Panel C . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes  -0.264*   -0.273**   
(BEEPS 2009) (0.136)   (0.135)   
Frequency of bribes   -0.264**   -0.214*  
(LITS 2006)  (0.130)   (0.127)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.023   0.020 
(BEEPS 2009)   (0.057)   (0.059) 
R-square 0.113 0.116 0.109 0.298 0.299 0.295 
Panel D . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors and regional character istics 
Frequency of bribes  -0.346**   -0.339**   
(BEEPS 2009) (0.133)   (0.161)   
Frequency of bribes   -0.263**   -0.247*  
(LITS 2006)  (0.126)   (0.136)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    0.054   0.041 
(BEEPS 2009)   (0.062)   (0.066) 
Out of labor force -0.071 -0.200 0.241 0.385 0.344 0.758 
(age 15-65) (0.486) (0.505) (0.523) (0.678) (0.609) (0.678) 
Primary education or below -0.180 -0.086 0.281 -0.571 -0.482 -0.172 
(age 15-65) (0.561) (0.477) (0.546) (0.567) (0.491) (0.547) 
Individual trust 0.038 0.055 0.070 0.031 0.050 0.059 
 (0.150) (0.139) (0.155) (0.165) (0.152) (0.170) 
R-square 0.322 0.323 0.319 0.300 0.300 0.296 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    
Industry x country fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables    Yes   Yes   Yes  
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions) 56 56 56 56 56 56 
 
Note: The table reports partial correlations and standard-errors for the difference in the quality of management 
practices. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a 
dummy for unknown size, dummy variables by types of ownership, by size of municipality and a dummy variable if 
the establishment is part of a larger firm. Standard-errors are clustered at the regional level. * denote a significant 
estimate at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. 
Source: BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), and authoUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV  
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Table 5. Falsification tests, contract dependence, concentration of inputs and PDQDJHUV¶
assessment of bar riers to doing business 
 
  
Linear probability model for stating that the following factors  
A re a severe obstacle to doing business: 
 
Corruption Quality of courts Quality of Courts  
Political 
instability 
C rimes & 
disorders Cor rupt Slow 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A .          Contract dependence 0.123*** 0.467*** 0.128 0.091** 0.104* 0.110** 
(Nunn 2007) (0.043) (0.125) (0.170) (0.042) (0.061) (0.045) 
R-square 0.070 0.114 0.128 0.049 0.093 0.070 
       
Panel B .       
Input diversification  0.230 -0.733 0.025 0.062 0.134 -0.137 
(-Herfindahl in 1997) (0.240) (0.565) (0.589) (0.181) (0.246) (0.165) 
R-square 0.069 0.111 0.128 0.048 0.092 0.068 
       
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,252 2,131 2,178 2,186 2,328 2,353 
Manufacturing sectors 114 114 114 114 114 114 
 
Licensing 
& permits Taxes  
Tax admi- 
-nistration 
Access to 
finance 
T ransport 
network 
Education 
labor force 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel C .          
Contract dependence 0.027 0.078 0.034 0.087 -0.097 0.123* 
(Nunn 2007) (0.036) (0.090) (0.046) (0.069) (0.067) (0.065) 
R-square 0.045 0.079 0.056 0.063 0.064 0.065 
       
Panel D .       
Input diversification -0.330** 0.212 -0.122 -0.143 -0.425** 0.294 
(-Herfindahl in 1997) (0.142) (0.292) (0.157) (0.238) (0.171) (0.192) 
R-square 0.046 0.079 0.056 0.063 0.065 0.064 
       
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,255 2,410 2,390 2,350 2,367 2,369 
Manufacturing sectors 114 114 114 114 114 114 
Note: The table reports the estimates of a linear probability model of a dummy variable for stating that a particular 
factor is a severe obstacle to doing business on a US measure of contract dependence and a US measure of input 
diversification controlling for regional fixed effects. More precisely, the observations are PDQDJHUV¶DVVHVVPHQWVRI
the obstacles to doing business in 10 transition countries. The dependent variable takes value one if the manager 
declares that the factor is a very severe obstacle to doing business. Non responses and refusals are treated as missing 
YDOXHV7KHZRUGLQJRIWKHTXHVWLRQLV³As I list some factors that can affect the current operations of a business, 
please look at this card and tell me if you think that each factor is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate 
Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment.´ Standard-
errors are clustered at the manufacturing sector level. * denote a significant estimate at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** 
at 1%. 
Source: BEEPS 2009 (EBRD-WB), Nunn (20DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
.  
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Table 6. Non parametr ic tests for differential effects of corruption within regions across 
manufacturing sectors 
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10 manufacturing sectors     
F-test frequency of bribes  2.977   2.801   
(BEEPS 2009) [p-value] [0.001]   [0.002]   
F-test frequency of bribes   2.796   2.805  
(LITS 2006) [p-value]  [0.002]   [0.002]  
F-test share of sales paid as bribes    2.776   2.027 
(BEEPS 2009) [p-value]   [0.003]   [0.030] 
R-square 0.203 0.197 0.198 0.235 0.231 0.231 
Panel B . Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
F-test frequency of bribes  1.800   1.682   
(BEEPS 2009) [p-value] [0.017]   [0.031]   
F-test frequency of bribes   4.120   4.665  
(LITS 2006) [p-value]  [0.000]   [0.000]  
F-test share of sales paid as bribes    5.100   4.062 
(BEEPS 2009) [p-value]   [0.000]   [0.000] 
R-square 0.254 0.260 0.264 0.283 0.292 0.290 
Panel C . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors     
F-test frequency of bribes  5.768   3.635   
(BEEPS 2009) [p-value] [0.000]   [0.000]   
F-test frequency of bribes   7.908   4.471  
(LITS 2006) [p-value]  [0.000]   [0.000]  
F-test share of sales paid as bribes    9.377   14.75 
(BEEPS 2009) [p-value]   [0.000]   [0.000] 
R-square 0.362 0.366 0.373 0.386 0.391 0.398 
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls    Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables    Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x 11 sectors) 385 385 385 385 385 385 
 
Note: The table reports F-test and its p-value for the differential effect of corruption on manufacturing sectors within 
a region. Formally, the model is, Yisrc Įs.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrcZLWKȜsc, manufacturing sector times country fixed 
HIIHFWVDQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Įs is the measure of sensitivity to corruption of manufacturing sector s. Crc is 
our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables. We test +RIRUDOOVĮV Į7KH)-test is clustered at 
the regional x industry level. A p-value below 0.1 denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of equal sensitivity to 
corruption at the 10% level, below 0.05 at 5%, below 0.01 at 1%, respectively. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV  
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Table 7. Difference-in-differences estimates by contract-dependence of the manufacturing 
sectors  
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -0.618   -0.682   
              x Contract dependence (1.158)   (1.269)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -1.451***   -1.583***  
              x Contract dependence  (0.551)   (0.579)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.722**   -0.719** 
              x Contract dependence   (0.286)   (0.313) 
R-square 0.191 0.193 0.193 0.225 0.226 0.226 
Panel B . Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -1.106   -1.195   
              x Contract dependence (1.156)   (1.252)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -1.406***   -1.507***  
              x Contract dependence  (0.529)   (0.561)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.529*   -0.465 
              x Contract dependence   (0.312)   (0.346) 
R-square 0.244 0.245 0.244 0.273 0.275 0.274 
Panel C . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -0.252   -0.242   
              x Contract dependence (0.906)   (1.091)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -1.438**   -1.559**  
              x Contract dependence  (0.688)   (0.720)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.511   -0.445 
              x Contract dependence   (0.395)   (0.446) 
R-square 0.343 0.345 0.344 0.367 0.369 0.368 
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls    Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables    Yes   Yes   Yes  
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386   386   386   386   386  
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables.  
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
 
 
  
48  
  
Table 8. Difference-in-differences estimates by contract-dependence of the manufacturing 
sectors correcting for US benchmarking bias 
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -1.080   -1.138   
              x Contract dependence (0.767)   (0.847)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -1.207***   -1.288***  
              x Contract dependence  (0.429)   (0.454)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.467**   -0.462** 
              x Contract dependence   (0.212)   (0.222) 
       
Panel B . Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -2.651**   -1.406*   
              x Contract dependence (1.276)   (0.723)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -1.259***   -1.239***  
              x Contract dependence  (0.399)   (0.420)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.575**   -0.504** 
              x Contract dependence   (0.231)   (0.248) 
       
Panel C . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -0.837   -1.259   
              x Contract dependence (0.728)   (1.009)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -1.358***   -1.419***  
              x Contract dependence  (0.412)   (0.433)  
Share of sales paid as bribes    -0.516**   -0.445* 
              x Contract dependence   (0.245)   (0.263) 
       
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls    Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables    Yes   Yes   Yes  
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386   386   386   386   386  
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables. We 
control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set of 
manufacturing sector dummies interacted with regional corruption. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table 9. Difference-in-differences estimates instrumenting the share of sales paid as bribes 
by household assessment of regional corruption  
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10, 22 and 59 manufacturing sectors   
Share of sales paid as bribes        
        x Contract dependence -1.831* -1.985* -3.026** -2.895** -2.084* -2.288* 
          (Nunn, 2007) (1.075) (1.143) (1.321) (1.310) (1.192) (1.298) 
       
F-test (First stage) 1.704 0.829 0.981 0.863 3.036 1.800 
Kleibergen-Paap 13.44 9.967 18.26 16.81 49.45 43.64 
Hansen J-statistics 8.059 10.27 26.62 27.54 53.47 51.55 
       
Panel B . Adding regional controls     
Share of sales paid as bribes  -2.525* -2.617* -3.439** -3.186** -2.529** -2.274* 
        x Contract dependence (1.306) (1.381) (1.523) (1.487) (1.258) (1.185) 
          (Nunn, 2007)       
Primary education or below  3.079 2.836 0.483 0.771 -1.075 -1.608 
        x Contract dependence (2.509) (2.579) (3.690) (3.654) (2.960) (2.908) 
Unemployed or out of labor force  -11.879** -11.459* -18.243* -17.161* -9.466 -7.628 
        x Contract dependence (5.950) (6.123) (9.313) (9.254) (6.986) (6.909) 
Inter-individual trust  1.508* 1.574* -1.878 -1.935 -0.706 -1.012* 
        x Contract dependence (0.797) (0.852) (1.184) (1.187) (0.540) (0.601) 
       
F-test (First stage) 0.902 0.934 0.605 0.546 2.024 1.208 
Kleibergen-Paap 14.14 16.36 15.43 14.07 41.35 35.68 
Hansen J-statistics 7.795 8.087 23.09 23.99 50.45 50.36 
       
11 Industries x country fixed effects Yes Yes     
22 Industries x country fixed effects   Yes Yes   
59 Industries x country fixed effects     Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables  Yes  Yes      Yes  
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386   386   386   386   386  
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is the regional share of sales paid as bribes and Xisrc a set of control 
variables. We control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set 
of manufacturing sector dummies interacted with household assessment of corruption. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶computations. 
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Table 10. Variation in the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of corruption 
across sub-samples 
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 Full sample B E EPS firms in the region >19 
B E EPS firms in the 
region > 49 
 O LS 2SLS O LS 2SLS O LS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Share of sales paid as bribes        
        x Contract dependence -0.464* -3.014** -0.493* -2.825** -0.395 -2.938** 
          (Nunn, 2007) (0.271) (1.366) (0.273) (1.279) (0.272) (1.473) 
       
F-test (First stage)  1.368  0.850   0.976 
Kleibergen-Paap  16.99  16.41  19.63 
Hansen J-statistics  22.27  30.12  29.06 
       
22 Industries x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,331 1,331 1,112 1,112 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386 373 373 292 292 
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is the regional share of sales paid as bribes and Xisrc a set of control 
variables. We control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set 
of manufacturing sector dummies interacted with household assessment of corruption. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table 11. Variation in the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of corruption 
across different firms 
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 Foreign owned 
establishments 
Large establishments 
>249 employees 
State owned 
establishments 
 O LS 2SLS O LS 2SLS O LS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Share of sales paid as bribes        
        x Contract dependence -0.591* -3.719* -0.578* -2.876* -0.616** -3.334* 
          (Nunn, 2007) (0.311) (1.970) (0.306) (1.603) (0.306) (1.816) 
        [«««[)RUHLJQRZQHG -0.051 0.245     
 (0.085) (0.347)     
        [«««[/DUJHILUP   -0.108 -0.083   
   (0.095) (0.203)   
        [«««[6WDWHRZQHG     -0.050 0.210 
     (0.163) (0.461) 
Foreign owned establishment 0.205 -0.050     
 (0.131) (0.287)     
Large establishment    0.302*** 0.275*   
(>249 employees)   (0.109) (0.157)   
State owned establishment     -0.033 -0.335 
     (0.207) (0.450) 
       
F-test (First stage)  1.013   1.044   0.782 
Kleibergen-Paap  25.87  27.99  29.86 
Hansen J-statistics  41.88  49.92  43.64 
       
22 Industries x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386 386 386 386 386 
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is the regional share of sales paid as bribes and Xisrc a set of control 
variables. We control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set 
of manufacturing sector dummies interacted with household assessment of corruption. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table 12. Corruption and different forms of management practices 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
     Share of college graduates 
 Monitoring No target Incentives Turn-over 
Production 
workers 
Administrative 
workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 11 manufacturing sectors O LS    
       
Frequency of bribes  -1.057*** -0.011 -0.224** 0.141 0.087*** 0.061 
(LITS 2006) (0.091) (0.019) (0.099) (1.603) (0.029) (0.037) 
R-square 0.237 0.114 0.180 0.126 0.244 0.259 
       
# Observations 1354 1336 1354 1214 1201 1227 
# clusters (regions) 56 56 56 56 56 56 
       
Panel B . Controlling for 11 manufacturing sectors D ID O LS    
Frequency of bribes  -1.876** 0.289*** -0.336 9.764* -0.186 -0.378** 
         x Contract dependence (0.866) (0.092) (0.542) (5.682) (0.136) (0.186) 
R-square 0.241 0.193 0.180 0.174 0.294 0.317 
       
# Observations 1354 1336 1354 1214 1201 1227 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386 387 369 367 370 
       
Panel C . Controlling for 11 manufacturing sectors D ID-I V     
Frequency of bribes  -1.862*** 0.303*** -0.266 8.229 -0.179 -0.367** 
         x Contract dependence (0.696) (0.087) (0.479) (5.014) (0.113) (0.153) 
 
      
F-test (First stage) 92.16 59.97 89.40 99.86 103.5 86.39 
Kleibergen-Paap 37.36 32.47 36.09 30.85 33.14 34.23 
Hansen J-statistics 10.61 13.65 10.82 3.378 16.45 13.25 
       
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
# Observations 1354 1336 1354 1214 1201 1227 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386 387 369 367 370 
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables. We 
control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set of 
manufacturing sector dummies interacted with regional corruption. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table 13. Corruption and different forms of management practices 
 Oper 
ations 
Central- 
ization Innovation 
R & D 
spending 
Main market 
 Regional International 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 11 manufacturing sectors O LS  
       
Frequency of bribes  -0.004 -0.066*** 0.030 -0.021 -0.036 0.011 
(LITS 2006) (0.040) (0.024) (0.045) (0.039) (0.055) (0.035) 
R-square 0.233 0.163 0.184 0.219 0.209 0.369 
       
# Observations 1354 1355 1348 1320 1343 1343 
# clusters (regions) 56 56 56 56 56 56 
       
Panel B . Controlling for 11 manufacturing sectors D ID O LS 
Frequency of bribes  -1.101*** 0.317** -0.843*** -0.735*** 0.919*** -0.945*** 
        x Contract dependence (0.199) (0.135) (0.232) (0.253) (0.237) (0.184) 
R-square 0.212 0.246 0.234 0.254 0.263 0.408 
       
# Observations 1351 1355 1348 1320 1343 1343 
# clusters (regions x industry) 385 386 385 382 385 385 
       
Panel C . Controlling for 11 manufacturing sectors D ID-I V   
Frequency of bribes  -0.679 0.263** -0.787*** -0.655*** 0.859*** -0.863*** 
        x Contract dependence (0.553) (0.114) (0.195) (0.229) (0.202) (0.150) 
       
F-test (First stage) 89.79 92.13 93.10 96.28 90.26 90.26 
Kleibergen-Paap 36.20 37.36 37.83 36.02 36.38 36.38 
Hansen J-statistics 10.61 19.93 8.12 7.85 8.77 11.55 
       
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 1351 1355 1348 1320 1343 1343 
# clusters (regions x industry) 385 386 385 382 385 385 
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables. We 
control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set of 
manufacturing sector dummies interacted with regional corruption. 
1. Noise controls: interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic function in age, highest degree completed) and 
interview characteristics (7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day - morning, lunch 
time, afternoon or evening -, the duration of the interview in minutes, and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects). 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by type of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), 1XQQDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Appendix.  
 
F igure A .1. Cor ruption by country and regional dispersion 
A .1..a. F i rm share of sales paid as bribes 
 
A .1.b. Household assessment of the frequency of corruption 
 
Note: The graphs show regional levels of corruption. The solid line represents the un-weighted-country average of 
regional measures of corruption. The vertical bars denote minimum and maximum levels. BGR stands for Bulgaria, BLR 
for Belarus, KAZ for Kazakstan, LTU for Lithuania, POL for Poland, ROM for Romania, RUS for Russia, SER for 
Serbia, UKR for Ukraine, and UZB for Uzbekistan. 
Source: BEEPS 2009, LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV  
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Table A .1. Contract dependence by manufacturing sectors 
 
10 manufacturing sectors, less dependent of contracts Contract dependence 
Manufacture of malt liquors and malt 0.11 
Manufacture of grain mill products 0.38 
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 0.47 
Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products 0.52 
Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 0.59 
Manufacture of tobacco products 0.60 
Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.60 
Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 0.60 
Manufacture of dairy products 0.64 
Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood,  
laminboard, particle board and other panels and boards 0.65 
10 manufacturing sectors, more dependent of contracts  
Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 0.99 
Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 0.99 
Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 0.99 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus  
for line telephony and line telegraphy 0.99 
Service activities related to printing 1.00 
Publishing of newspapers, journals and periodicals 1.00 
Other publishing 1.00 
Printing 1.00 
Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous 
products 1.00 
Reproduction of recorded media 1.00 
 
Note: Contract dependence of manufacturing sectors at the ISIC3.1 4 digits level. The measure is the share of 
relationship-specific inputs used by each US manufacturing sector in 1997. It is computed using Nunn (2007) share 
of inputs neither traded on open markets nor listed on leaflets at the 6-digit I-O classification level. It is converted to 
ISIC3.1 sectors using the BEA correspondence between the I-O classification and the NAICS 1997 and the BLS 
correspondence files between NAICS 1997 and 2002 and NAICS 2002 and ISIC3.1. 
Source: Nunn (2007), Rauch (1999) DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table A .2. Product complexity by manufacturing sectors 
 
10 manufacturing sectors, with less complex product (minus) Herfindahl 
Manufacture of malt liquors and malt -0.24 
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats -0.21 
Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves -0.20 
Manufacture of tobacco products -0.19 
Processing and preserving of fish and fish products -0.18 
Publishing of newspapers, journals and periodicals -0.18 
Tanning and dressing of leather -0.18 
Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers -0.17 
Manufacture of dairy products -0.17 
Other publishing -0.17 
10 manufacturing sectors, with more complex product  
Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations,  
perfumes and toilet preparations -0.06 
Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds -0.06 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines -0.06 
Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery -0.05 
Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap -0.05 
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. -0.05 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. -0.05 
Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals -0.05 
Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c. -0.04 
Manufacture of motor vehicles -0.04 
 
Note: Product complexity is (minus the) Herfindahl index computed from the BEA 1997 benchmark use table by 
industry at the 6-digits I-O level. It is converted to ISIC3.1 sectors using the BEA correspondence between the I-O 
classification and the NAICS 1997 and the BLS correspondence files between NAICS 1997 and 2002 and NAICS 
2002 and ISIC3.1. The presented index is minus the usual Herfindahl index and higher values indicate sectors with 
lower input concentration. 
Source: BEA 1997 benchmark use table by industry DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table A .3. Correlations between different metr ics of institutional dependence by 
manufacturing sectors 
 
       
 Contract dependence Concentration of inputs 
 
Share of inputs neither 
sold on exchange 
markets nor having 
listed prices 
Share of inputs 
not sold on 
exchange markets 
Herfindahl 
(minus) 
G ini 
(minus) 
Share 
20 
(minus) 
 (lib) (cons) (lib) (cons) 
   Panel A . L inear correlations between metr ics of institutional dependence   
Contract dependence (lib) 1.00       
Contract dependence (cons) 0.93 1.00      
Contract dependence based 
on exchange (lib) 0.62 0.59 1.00     
Contract dependence based 
on exchange (cons) 0.66 0.62 0.95 1.00    
(minus) Herfindahl index 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.19 1.00   
(minus) Gini index 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.35 0.69 1.00  
(minus) Shareof the 20 
most important inputs 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.38 0.70 0.98 1.00 
Panel B . Non-linear correlations between metr ics of institutional dependence   
Contract dependence (lib) 1.00       
Contract dependence (cons) 0.86 1.00      
Contract dependence based 
on exchange (lib) 0.62 0.58 1.00     
Contract dependence based 
on exchange (cons) 0.64 0.56 0.95 1.00    
(minus) Herfindahl index -0.03 -0.07 0.10 0.17 1.00   
(minus) Gini index 0.17 0.13 0.31 0.39 0.72 1.00  
(minus) Shareof the 20 
most important inputs 0.18 0.14 0.32 0.40 0.69 0.99 1.00 
# M anufacturing sectors 126 126   126   126   126   126   126  
 
Note: Contract dependence of manufacturing sectors at the ISIC3.1 4 digits level. The measure is the share of 
relationship-specific inputs used by each US manufacturing sector in 1997. It is computed using Nunn (2007) share 
of inputs neither traded on open markets nor listed on leaflets at the 6-digit I-O classification level. (Minus the) 
Herfindahl index, (minus the) Gini index, (minus the) share of the 20 most important inputs computed from the BEA 
1997 benchmark use table by industry at the 6-digits I-O level. All measures are converted to ISIC3.1 sectors using 
the BEA correspondence between the I-O classification and the NAICS 1997 and the BLS correspondence files 
between NAICS 1997 and 2002 and NAICS 2002 and ISIC3.1. 
Source: Nunn (2007), Rauch (1999) DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table A .4. Difference-in-differences estimate using the index of product complexity  
(minus the Herfindahl index of inputs)  
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10 manufacturing sectors     
       
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -7.953   -7.531   
        x Product complexity (6.605)   (7.036)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -9.046***   -9.752***  
        x Product complexity  (3.087)   (3.238)  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009)   -5.627***   -5.634*** 
        x Product complexity   (1.669)   (1.785) 
R-square 0.192 0.193 0.194 0.225 0.227 0.227 
Panel B . Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -2.549   -2.293   
        x Product complexity (4.220)   (4.348)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -6.347**   -7.145**  
        x Product complexity  (2.804)   (2.833)  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009)   -4.030**   -4.200** 
        x Product complexity   (1.707)   (1.857) 
R-square 0.244 0.245 0.245 0.273 0.275 0.275 
Panel C . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -3.462   -4.802   
        x Product complexity (4.122)   (4.175)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -4.403   -5.506*  
        x Product complexity  (2.934)   (2.951)  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009)   -1.907   -2.613 
        x Product complexity   (2.179)   (2.250) 
R-square 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.368 0.369 0.368 
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls    Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables    Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386   386   386   386   386  
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables.  
1. Noise controls include interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic in age, highest degree) and interview 
characteristics. The later include 7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day (morning, 
lunch time, afternoon or evening), the duration of the interview (in minutes), and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects. 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by types of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WB), DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV 
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Table A .5. Difference-in-differences estimate using the index of product complexity  
(minus the Herfindahl index of inputs) and correcting for US benchmarking bias 
 
Dependent variable: Average quality of management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A . Controlling for 10 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009)       
        x Product complexity 0.836   0.758   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006) (5.745)   (5.870)   
        x Product complexity  -7.871***   -8.645***  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009)  (2.872)   (2.997)  
        x Product complexity   -3.453**   -3.628** 
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009)   (1.584)   (1.611) 
       
Panel B . Controlling for 22 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) 3.089   2.580   
        x Product complexity (4.349)   (4.196)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -5.511*   -6.076**  
        x Product complexity  (2.853)   (2.913)  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009)   -4.197***   -4.329*** 
        x Product complexity   (1.193)   (1.227) 
       
Panel C . Controlling for 59 manufacturing sectors     
Frequency of bribes (BEEPS 2009) -2.080   -1.276   
        x Product complexity (3.539)   (3.779)   
Frequency of bribes (LITS 2006)  -4.244   -4.993  
        x Product complexity  (3.188)   (3.157)  
Share of sales paid as bribes (BEEPS 2009)   -2.980**   -3.482*** 
        x Product complexity   (1.308)   (1.337) 
       
Industry x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise controls    Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables    Yes   Yes   Yes  
# Observations 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,355 
# clusters (regions x industry) 386 386   386   386   386   386  
 
Note: The table reports the estimates of the equation Yisrc ĮH[Ss.Crc+XisrcȕȜscįrcİisrc ZLWK Ȝsc, manufacturing 
VHFWRU WLPHV FRXQWU\ IL[HG HIIHFWV DQGįrc, regional fixed effects. Exps is the measure of sensitivity to corruption 
computed using the US input-output table. Crc is our measure of corruption and Xisrc a set of control variables. We 
control for the US benchmarking bias by instrumenting the interaction term, exps.Crc, using a full set of 
manufacturing sector dummies interacted with regional corruption. 
1. Noise controls include interviewer characteristics (gender, a quadratic in age, highest degree) and interview 
characteristics. The later include 7 dummies for the days of the week, 4 dummies for the time of the day (morning, 
lunch time, afternoon or evening), the duration of the interview (in minutes), and a quadratic trend in the date of the 
interview allowing for business cycle effects. 
2. Additional control variables include a quadratic function of size (number of full-time employees), a dummy for 
unknown size, dummy variables by types of ownership, dummy variables by size of municipality and a dummy 
variable if the establishment is part of a larger firm. 
Source: MOI survey, BEEPS 2009 and LITS 2006 (EBRD-WBDQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV. 
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Table A .6. Correlations between management practices 
 
 Quality of management practices Absence of Subjective management quality Centra- 
 Average Monitoring Targets Incentives Operations target Overall People Process -lization 
 (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
A . Exper ience based measures of management quality       
Average 1.00          
Monitoring 0.50 1.00         
Targets 0.72 0.12 1.00        
Incentives 0.71 0.04 0.52 1.00       
Operations 0.59 0.09 0.16 0.22 1.00      
No target 0.28 0.19 0.40 0.06 0.06 1.00     
B . Subjective self-assessment of management quality       
Overall 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.00 1.00    
People 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.20 -0.02 0.74 1.00   
Process 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.21 -0.01 0.77 0.72 1.00  
C . O ther establishment character istics       
Centralization -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 1.00 
Establishment size 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 
 
Note: The Table reports pair-wise linear correlations between different metric of the quality of management practices. 
Source: MOI 2010 (EBRD-WB) DQGDXWKRUV¶FRPSXWDWLRQV. 
